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JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO NONLEGAL
DECISIONMAKERS: IMPOSING SIMPLISTIC
SOLUTIONS ON PROBLEMS OF COGNITIVE
COMPLEXITY IN MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW*
Donald N. Bersoff **
F, as the clich6 goes, consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds,' most
members of the Supreme Court are in no danger of being judged as
mind-size deficient. Beginning in 1979 and continuing through 1991, the
Court has shown a decided preference for professional, rather than judicial,
decisionmaking in cases concerning the evaluation and treatment of those
designated as mentally disabled. But this preference for professional judg-
ment is incongruent with the Court's even more longstanding skepticism
about the ability of psychiatrists and psychologists to make sound clinical
judgments. This skepticism arose when empirical studies questioned the
ability of mental health professionals to make accurate diagnostic and treat-
ment decisions. Critical literature and the new generation of social science
evidence clearly support the Court's apprehension. By implication, how-
ever, they cast considerable doubt on the Court's reliance on mental health
professionals and administrators to make essentially unreviewable decisions
that determine the constitutional and statutory rights of mentally ill and
* This Article was stimulated by those who gave papers to the Section on Law and
Mental Disability at the 1991 AALS Annual Meeting, for which the author is grateful. An
abbreviated version of this Article was presented to the Section on Law and Mental Disability
at the 1992 AALS Annual Meeting.
** B.S., M.A., Ph.D. (Psychology), New York University; J.D., Yale University. Profes-
sor of Law, Villanova University School of Law; Professor of Psychology, Hahnemann Uni-
versity Graduate School Department of Mental Health Sciences; Director, Law & Psychology
Program, Villanova Law School and Hahnemann Graduate School.
The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Natacha Blain, Nancy
Canizio, David Glass, and Adam Rosen, students in the Villanova/Hahnemann Law & Psy-
chology Program. This Article was substantially improved as the result of comments from the
author's colleagues and critics Michael Churgin, Robyn Dawes, Robert Dinerstein, David
Faust, Peter Margulies, John Monahan, James Ogloff, Michael Perlin, Michael Saks, and Jay
Ziskin who reviewed earlier drafts. The author, of course, accepts full responsibility for the
final version.
1. The clich6 is a paraphrase of Ralph Waldo Emerson's lesser known but accurate aph-
orism: "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds adored by little statesmen and
philosophers and divines." JOHN BARTLETr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 606 (Emily Morison
Beck ed., 14th ed. 1968) (1855).
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mentally retarded persons.2
This Article explores the tension between a preference for decisionmaking
by mental health professionals on issues of mental disability law and those
professionals' capacity for making accurate judgments. The primary vehicle
for this exploration is social science research generated by cognitive and so-
cial psychologists. Part I reviews relevant Supreme Court decisions, their
application by lower courts concerning professional judgments, and the in-
creasing preference for informal, nonjudicial fora in which such judgments
will be exercised. Part II, the core of this Article, reviews expanding, re-
vealing research of cognitive psychologists regarding human decisionmaking
generally, and clinical and forensic decisionmaking particularly. Part III,
relying heavily on the work of social psychologists examining procedural
justice, argues that a preference for informal procedures is likely to exacer-
bate decisional errors by mental health professionals and, as a result, is an-
tagonistic to the core adjudicatory values of fairness and accuracy. In Part
2. The conflict between judicial and quasi-judicial decisionmaking has preoccupied the
legal system for a long time and is not new to mental disability law. See, e.g., JERRY L.
MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985). In 1927, Carrie Buck's
counsel argued that the Supreme Court's approval of Virginia's compulsory sterilization law,
under which the initial decision to sterilize was made by a special board of directors of the
state hospital where the mentally retarded person resided, would establish a "reign of doctors
... and the worst forms of tyranny practiced." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 202 (1927). See
also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (upholding a state law allowing, under certain
circumstances, antipsychotic drug treatment of inmates against their will).
A similar debate took place in criminal law. In 1930, one writer predicted that "[w]e shall
ultimately come to admit society has been unfortunate in handing over criminals to lawyers
and judges.... A hundred years ago we allowed lawyers and judges to have the same control
of the insane classes as they still exert over criminal groups, but we now recognize that insanity
is a highly diversified and complex medical problem which we entrust to properly trained
experts .... HARRY ELMER BARNES, THE STORY OF PUNISHMENT 266 (1930). A few years
later, a social scientist proposed that the sentencing of criminal defendants be lodged in a panel
comprised of a judge, a mental health professional, and a sociologist or educator. SHELDON
GLUECK, CRIME AND JUSTICE 225-26 (1936); cf Lawrence Kubie, Provisions for the Care of
Children of Divorced Parents: A New Legal Instrument, 73 YALE L.J. 1197, 1198 (1964) (rec-
ommendation by psychiatrist that custody matters be subjected to binding arbitration by a
panel consisting of pediatrician, child psychiatrist, educator, and lawyer or clergyperson).
Although recognizing that the "insights of others who study human behavior" would be
helpful to sentencing judges, Judge Marvin Frankel concluded that sentencing was best left to
the judiciary. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 74-75 (1972). Presaging the sub-
stantive and procedural arguments in this Article, he argued that "much would be lost in the
way of habitual acceptance and compliance if the rendering of judgment were transferred
wholly from the judicial to some more clinical office," and questioned "whether there are other
professions genuinely more 'expert' to whom the ultimate responsibility would be better as-
signed." Id. at 55. Appraising human behavior was difficult, but the complexity of the task
was overrated as was "the extent of effective knowledge possessed by psychiatrists and psy-
chologists." Id. at 56. This judgment is still largely correct today. At bottom, criminal re-
sponsibility and penalties, he argued, "are judgments that must turn.., upon the weighing of
values, interests, and choices in the everyday province of legal rather than psychiatric study."
Id. Though sentencing decisions may be informed by social science and mental health data,
the ultimate decision remains within the sound discretion of the trial judge. See the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (1988), 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988) (establishing
a Sentencing Commission and statutorily-mandated Sentencing Guidelines). The Commis-
sion's work, however, has not been without its critics and the Sentencing Guidelines themselves
have been the subject of considerable litigation. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
1112 (1992); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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IV, the Article concludes that the human decisionmaking and procedural
justice literature is incompatible with a preference for nonlegal decisionmak-
ing in cases involving the rights of the mentally disabled.




The Supreme Court's approval of using nonjudicial means in order to de-
cide procedural and substantive rights of the mentally disabled and the at-
tenuation of liability for mistaken professional judgments concerning those
rights began to take shape in Parham v. J.R..3 Parham involved the applica-
tion of procedural due process to the admission of children to mental hospi-
tals. The Court rejected the use of an adversary hearing presided over by a
judge in which nonconsenting minors would be represented by counsel and
permitted to present and cross-examine witnesses in favor of "informal,
traditional medical investigative techniques" controlled by psychiatrists.
4
"Due process," the Court said, "has never been thought to require that the
neutral and detached trier of fact be law trained or a judicial or administra-
tive officer," 5 particularly when "the questions are essentially medical in
character: whether the child is mentally or emotionally ill and whether he
can benefit from the treatment that is provided by the state."'6 In such cases,
the Court concluded, "the supposed protections of an adversary proceeding
to determine the appropriateness of medical decisions for the commitment
and treatment of mental and emotional illness may well be more illusory
than real."'7
In Youngberg v. Romeo,8 the Court extended its reliance on professional
decisionmaking to substantive rights. In deciding whether mental health ex-
perts could be held liable for failure to provide treatment, the Court severely
limited judicial review of professional decisionmaking. The Court held that
it would be inappropriate "for the courts to specify which of several profes-
sionally accepted choices should have been made." 9 Rather, "liability may
be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on
3. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
4. Id. at 607.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 609.
7. Id. This statement is re-examined in Part IV. The Court's conclusion has been se-
verely criticized. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, An Invitation to the Dance: An Empirical Re-
sponse to Chief Justice Warren Burger's "Time-Consuming Procedural Minuets" Theory in
Parham v. J.R., 9 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 149 (1981); Gail Perry & Gary Mel-
ton, Precedential Value of Judicial Notice of Social Facts: Parham as an Example, 22 J. FAM.
L. 633 (1983-84). See also John Ensminger & Thomas Liquori, The Therapeutic Significance
of the Civil Commitment Hearing: An Unexplored Potential, 6 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5 (1978).
8. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
9. Id. at 321.
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such a judgment."' 10
Most recently, in Washington v. Harper,1 I the Court extended Parham
and Youngberg to a situation involving compelled administration of psycho-
tropic drugs to competent but mentally ill prisoners. The Court concluded
"that an inmate's interests are adequately protected, and perhaps better
served, by allowing the decision to medicate to be made by medical profes-
sionals rather than a judge."'12 Viewing judicial hearings as "chimerical,"' 3
ineffective, and superficial, the Court held that due process requires no more
than an "administrative review using medical decisionmakers" to override
an inmate's refusal to consent.14
In the last decade, appellate courts have had many opportunities to apply,
10. Id. at 323.
11. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
12. Id. at 231.
13. Id. at 234 n.13.
14. Id. at 233. "These cases place direct responsibility for evaluating and safe-guarding
fundamental liberty interests into the hands of health care professionals, creating, in effect, a
new class of 'defacto magistrates.'" Douglas B. Marlowe, The Defacto Magistrate: Psycholegal
Decision-Making in the General Hospital, in THE PRACTICE OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY AND
PSYCHOLOGY IN THE GENERAL HOSPITAL 6 (Harvey Bluestone et al. eds., forthcoming)
[hereinafter Marlowe; page citations are to manuscript]. Other authors have viewed the
Court's opinions as signaling a shift from legal due process to "medical due process." Saleem
A. Shah, Legal and Mental Health System Interactions, 4 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 219, 228
(1981) [hereinafter Shah] (quoting Alexander D. Brooks, The Impact of Law on Psychiatric
Hospitalization: Onslaught or Imperative Reform?, in COPING WITH THE LEGAL ONSLAUGHT
13, 24 (Seymour L. Halleck ed., 1979)).
In my view, the Court's decisions of the past 15 years, narrowing the substantive and proce-
dural rights of the mentally disabled, are not revolutionary but simply reflect a reemergence of
judicial attitudes toward this population that preceded the patients' rights movement begun 25
years ago. "Until the late 1960s most state commitment processes were medical rather than
judicial .... [P]atients could be hospitalized on the statement of two physicians, without
advice of counsel, a hearing, or any recourse other than a writ of habeas corpus." Eric
Turkheimer & Charles D.H. Parry, Why the Gap? Practice and Policy in Civil Commitment
Hearings, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 646, 646 (1992) [hereinafter Why the Gap?]. In 1971, it was
reported that 33 jurisdictions still permitted involuntary commitment by medical certification
or administrative tribunal. SAMUEL J. BRAKEL & RONALD S. ROCK, THE MENTALLY Dis-
ABLED AND THE LAW 55-59 (1971).
[But,] [i]n the 1960's and early 1970's, public opinion shifted abruptly from
wide-spread support of extensive civil commitment to support of significant lim-
its on the state's commitment authority .... "Medical" models of civil commit-
ment, which conferred broad authority on mental health experts to hospitalize
coercively persons they deemed mentally ill and in need of hospitalization, were
changed drastically in favor of "legal" models of commitment. Under a "medi-
cal" model a medical specialist, such as a psychiatrist, has broad authority
under law to evaluate and hospitalize a patient he finds mentally ill and in need
of treatment. Under a "legal" model, significant substantive and procedural
safeguards limit the authority of medical specialists to commit persons deemed
mentally ill.
Mary L. Durham & John Q. La Fond, The Empirical Consequences and Policy Implications of
Broadening the Statutory Criteria for Civil Commitment, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 395, 397
(1985) [hereinafter Durham & La Fond]. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, 1 MENTAL Dis-
ABILITY LAW § 2.04; 2 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW §§ 4.02-4.04; 2 MENTAL DISABILITY
LAW § 5.03 (1989).
For other cases supporting administrative and professional decisionmaking, see DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291
(1982); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Bell v.
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if not interpret, the professional judgment rule developed in Youngberg.'5 It
is now clear that mentally disabled plaintiffs complaining of inappropriate
professional decisionmaking will have to meet an inordinately high eviden-
tiary burden to prevail. Proof of negligence, consonant with a malpractice
standard, will not suffice. As the Third Circuit recently held, "[p]rofessional
judgment is a relatively deferential standard," requiring "only that a state
actor exercise professional judgment in choosing the appropriate course of
action."1 6 The appellate courts view the Youngberg rule as requiring some-
thing akin to recklessness or fault, closer to deliberate indifference than sim-
ple negligence. Essentially, plaintiffs will have to prove that the professional
judgment exercised was arbitrary before the court will find state-employed
mental health professionals liable for their decisions, even if those decisions
deprive mentally disabled persons of their constitutional rights.17
In such cases, expert judgment is extremely constricted. In perhaps the
fullest discussion of the issue, the Second Circuit maintained that "the role
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78
(1978); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
The preference for informal decisionmaking and reliance on mental health professionals to
decide cases concerning mentally disabled persons is grounded in the Supreme Court's funda-
mentally flawed assumption that the issues in these cases are primarily medical or psychiatric
ones. Rather, the ultimate issues in these cases concern liberty, autonomy, and dignity, and
thus "the ultimate question in mental health law is always social, moral, political, and legal."
Stephen J. Morse, Treating Crazy People Less Specially, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 353, 359 (1987)
[hereinafter Treating Crazy People]. See also id. at 380-85 (discussing procedural policies).
The only case that may be seen as opposing the trend is Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113
(1990). The psychiatrists who admitted Mr. Burch as a voluntary patient failed, however, to
make a professional judgment as to his capacity to consent to hospitalization and to afford him
his statutory right under state law to a judicial hearing to challenge a determination that he
met the standards for involuntary commitment. The Court saw the professionals' failures as
an "abuse of their broadly delegated, uncircumscribed power to effect the deprivation at is-
sue." 494 U.S. at 136. In Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992), the Court held that an
involuntarily institutionalized insanity acquittee who was no longer mentally ill was entitled to
a statutorily-prescribed hearing in order to determine grounds for continued confinement. But
the Court noted that no professional at the hearing was willing to offer a definitive judgment
that Foucha "would be a danger to the community." Id. at 1786. Therefore, continued con-
finement was a Constitutional violation. Id. Similarly, although Justice Thomas' dissent ac-
cused the majority in Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1823-25 (1992) of adopting stricter
standards than in Harper for reviewing the compelled administration of antipsychotic medica-
tion to pretrial detainees, the majority explicitly denied that accusation. Id. at 1815.
15. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
16. Shaw by Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1146 (3d Cir. 1990).
17. Id. at 1146-47; Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274 (3d Cir. 1990);
United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Estate of Conners by Mere-
dith v. O'Connor, 846 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1988); Santana v. Collazo, 793 F.2d 41 (1st Cir.
1986); Wells v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1985); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir.
1983).
On occasion, plaintiffs have won despite the rule. See, e.g., Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 87
(3d Cir. 1986) (continued confinement in state institution for mentally retarded persons de-
prived plaintiff of substantive right to liberty in face of "unanimous professional opinion" that
plaintiff could live in less restrictive environment); Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367, 375
(4th Cir. 1986) (placement of incompetent adult in short term detoxification treatment center
violated substantive due process since no professional agreed such placement was compatible
with prescribed treatment). Although in these cases the courts ruled against the state, the
question arises whether plaintiffs can prevail in such cases only if they show that unanimity of
professional judgment is consistent with their position or that the state failed to follow the
recommendations and opinions of professionals concerned with their care.
19921
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of the experts is only to assist the court in ascertaining what the minimum
professional standard is"'18 and whether "professional judgment in fact was
exercised."' 9 Even if every expert testified that other placements for men-
tally retarded plaintiffs were better than the one recommended by the treat-
ing professionals, "the federal courts may only decide whether the treatment
or residence setting that actually was selected was a 'substantial departure'
from prevailing standards of practice." '20 The Fourth Circuit's en banc opin-
ion in United States v. Charters,2' applying Youngberg, held that the only
relevant question that expert witnesses could permissibly answer was
whether the treatment decision was "reached by a process so completely out
of professional bounds as to make it explicable only as an arbitrary, nonpro-
fessional one."'22
This heavy reliance by the Supreme Court on the judgment of mental
health professionals does not comport with its longstanding disparagement
of the judgment of psychiatrists and psychologists and its concern about
their ability to make reliable and valid decisions. As Chief Justice Burger
noted in his concurring opinion in O'Connor v. Donaldson,23 "[t]here can be
little responsible debate regarding the 'uncertainty of diagnosis in this field
and the tentativeness of professional judgment.' "24 The majority, as well,
acknowledged the "uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis and therapy, and
[that] the reported cases are replete with evidence of the divergence of medi-
cal opinion in this vexing area."'25 The Court has also described medical and
psychiatric diagnosis as fallible26 and based on impressions drawn from sub-
18. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 902 F.2d 1085, 1089 (2d Cir.
1990) [hereinafter Good Will IAl, quoting Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v.
Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1248 (2d Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Goodwill ].
19. Good Will 1, 737 F.2d at 1248 (quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321).
20. Id. at 1248-49 (citation omitted).
21. 863 F.2d 302, 313 (4th Cir. 1988).
22. Id. For similar views, see S. H. v. Edwards, 860 F.2d 1045 (11th Cir. 1988); Lelsz v.
Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1987). For a trenchant critique of the court's application
of Youngberg in Charters, see Michael L. Perlin, Are Courts Competent to Decide Competency
Questions?: Stripping the Facade from United States v. Charters, 38 KAN. L. REV. 957, 965-66,
975-81, 993 (1990) [hereinafter Are Courts Competent?]. "There is simply no lesser standard of
judicial review than that articulated in Youngberg. The professional's decision must be so
illogical, arbitrary or vague as to, in effect, constitute no decision at all ...." Marlowe, supra
note 14 at 7. Another issue deserving separate analysis is whether this limited role for experts
is at odds with the Supreme Court's reliance on competing professionals to determine the
potential for dangerous behavior by defendants facing the death penalty or deprivations of
other interests protected by the Constitution. See infra notes 164-73 and accompanying text;
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
23. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
24. Id. at 584 (quoting Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 360, 375 (1956)) (Burger,
C.J., concurring).
25. Id. at 579.
26. Parham, 442 U.S. at 609. "Even under the best of circumstances psychiatric diagnosis
and therapy decisions are fraught with uncertainties." Id. at 628. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"Professionals... disagree strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or
profoundly retarded individuals is even possible" and whether a general prevailing professional
practice exists. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 n.20 (1982). See also Youngberg, 457
U.S. at 331 (Burger, C.J., concurring in judgment); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 231-
32 (1990) (difficulty in assessing imental patients' intentions).
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jective analysis. 2 7 The criticism continues unabated into the present dec-
ade.28 In this light, it is incongruous that the Court's serious concern about
the indeterminacy, inexactitude, and instability of judgments by mental
health professionals coexists with their elevation by the Court to the position
of ultimate decision-maker.
II. COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO HUMAN
DECISIONMAKING
"Cognitive science is an umbrella term encompassing research that fo-
cuses on understanding the mind.... In cognitive psychology... research-
ers examine the mind from the 'top down,' by considering what is already
known about human mental activity and behavior, and then exploring what
internal processes could possibly explain those phenomena."'29
27. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979). In fact, the inaccuracy of professional
diagnostic judgments was one of the major factors that led the Court to adopt a clear and
convincing standard of proof, rather than a higher standard, in civil commitment proceedings.
"Given the lack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious ques-
tion as to whether a state could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is
both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous." Id. at 429.
28. See, e.g., Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1783, n.3 (acknowledging probable validity to view that
"psychiatry is not an exact science and psychiatrists widely disagree on what constitutes
mental illness"); id. at 1801 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("it is unwise.., to suggest that a deter-
mination that a person has 'regained sanity' is precise. Psychiatry is not.., an exact science
.... " (internal citations omitted)); Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 181, (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment) (doubtful that experts can establish "baseline of normality" for any particular de-
fendant); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 231 (1990) (difficulty in assessing mental pa-
tients' intentions); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 293-94 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(evidence "overwhelming" in support of conclusion that available diagnostic tools cannot reli-
ably predict whether minors will act violently); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 n. 13
(quoting Greenwood); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 n.20 (1982) ("Professionals...
disagree strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or profoundly re-
tarded individuals is even possible."); Id. at 331 (Burger, C.J., concurring in judgment) (doubt-
ful that "generally accepted or prevailing professional practice" exists). Perhaps the most
comprehensive summary appears in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985): "Psychiatry is
not... an exact science, and psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes
mental illness, on the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and symptoms, on
cure and treatment, and on the likelihood of future dangerousness." Id. at 81.
This forty year record of denigration of expertise by mental health professionals has been
expressed by most members of the Court regardless of political ideology and their views on
constitutional jurisprudence. "A number of Supreme Court Justices ... have written on the
incertitude of mental health clinician testimony." Edmund V. Ludwig, The Mentally Ill
Homeless: Evolving Involuntary Commitment Issues, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1085, 1100 (1991). In
contrast, the medicalization of due process has reemerged only in the last 15 years, reflecting
the increasingly conservative membership of the Court and its preference for decreased in-
volvement by the judiciary in adjudicating the rights of mentally disabled persons. See supra
note 14.
29. Rebecca Dresser, Review Essay/Making Up Our Minds: Can Law Survive Cognitive
Science?, 10(1) CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 27, 28 (1991). The critical study of judgment may be said
to have begun 40 years ago with the work of Ward Edwards, The Theory of Decision Making,
51 PSYCHOL. BULL. 380 (1954) and PAUL E. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PRE-
DICTION (1954). "Research on clinical judgment and decision making has been active for
about 20 years." Arthur S. Elstein, Cognitive Processes in Clinical Inference and Decision
Making, in REASONING, INFERENCE, & JUDGMENT IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 17, 17 (Den-
nis C. Turk & Peter Salovey eds., 1988) [hereinafter TURK & SALOVEY]. "Psychological re-
search on decision making describes and analyzes the cognitive processes and principles
employed in decision making under uncertainty. It is concerned with what people actually do,
1992]
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A. THEORY AND RESEARCH ON THE VAGARIES OF HUMAN JUDGMENT
AND THEIR APPLICATION TO CLINICAL DETERMINATION
The Supreme Court's doubt about, if not criticism of, the reliability and
validity of decisionmaking by mental health professionals though not sup-
ported in its opinions by data is, however, buttressed by social science re-
search. 30 Unlike its general preference for professional rather than judicial
decisionmaking, the Court's doubt of mental health professional reliability
has considerable merit. The support comes from the flourishing interdisci-
plinary study of the "psychology of judgment and decision-making. ' 31
not with what they should do; the normative theory serves as the standard of comparison." Id.
at 3 1. For a brief history of the developments in cognitive and social psychology that stimu-
lated research on human decision-making, see RICHARD E. NISBETr & LEE Ross, HUMAN
INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 4-6 (1980) [hereinafter
HUMAN INFERENCE].
30. This research goes beyond studies cited in older law review articles that question the
accuracy of diagnostic decisions by mental health professionals. Eg., Bruce J. Ennis &
Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Court-
room, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693 (1974); Ronald S. Gass, Comment, The Psychologist as Expert
Witness: Science in the Courtroom?, 38 MD. L. REV. 539 (1979). For a controversial but
valuable compilation of the literature challenging the accuracy of mental health professionals'
diagnostic and treatment decisions and the psychometric soundness of the assessment devices
upon which these decisions depend, see JAY ZISKIN & DAVID FAUST, COPING WITH PSYCHI-
ATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 1-3 (4th ed. 1988). The work cited in this Article
has been generated primarily by cognitive psychologists studying human judgment in a variety
of contexts.
31. Reid Hastie, A Review from a High Place: The Field of Judgment and Decision-mak-
ing as Revealed in Current Textbooks, 2 PSYCHOL. SCI. 135, 135 (1991). "The 'cognitive sci-
ences' connotes an interdisciplinary effort that cuts across neuroscience, psychology,
linguistics, anthropology, artificial intelligence, and philosophy." Steven L. Winter, Transcen-
dental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1105, 1109 n.7 (1989).
In the past decade a number of influential texts and articles have appeared in the literature,
supporting Hastie's conclusion. E.g., ROBYN DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN
WORLD (1988); THOMAS GILOVITCH, How WE KNOW WHAT ISN'T SO: THE FALLIBILITY
OF HUMAN REASONING IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1991); JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING
(Hal R. Arkes & Kenneth R. Hammond eds., 1986); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); ARTHUR NEZU & CHRISTINE
NEZU, CLINICAL DECISION MAKING IN BEHAVIOR THERAPY (1989) [hereinafter NEZU &
NEZU]; HUMAN INFERENCE, supra note 29; John W. Payne et al., Behavioral Decision Re-
search: A Constructive Processing Approach, in 43 ANNUAL REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY 88
(Mark R. Rozenzweig & Lyman W. Porter eds. 1992) [hereinafter Payne et al.]; HOWARD
RACHLIN, JUDGMENT, DECISION, AND CHOICE: A COGNITIVE/BEHAVORIAL SYNTHESIS
(1989); TURK & SALOVEY, supra note 29; J. FRANK YATES, JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAK-
ING (1990); Hal R. Arkes, Principles in Judgment/Decision-making Research Pertinent to
Legal Proceedings, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 429 (1989) [hereinafter Arkes]; Jean C. Beckham et al.,
Decision Making and Examiner Bias in Forensic Expert Recommendations for Not Guilty by
Reason of Insanity, 13 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 79 (1989) [hereinafter, Beckham et al.]; David
Faust, Research on Human Judgment and its Application to Clinical Practice, 17 PROF.
PSYCHOL. 420 (1986) [hereinafter Faust]; Benjamin Kleinmuntz, The Scientific Study of
Clinical Judgment in Psychology and Medicine, 4 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 111 (1984);
Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by
Heuristics, 15 L. & Soc'Y REV. 123 (1981) [hereinafter Saks & Kidd]. See also PAUL E.
MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND A
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE (1954); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of
Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 237 (1973) [hereinafter Psychology of Prediction].
Some of this research is beginning to make its way into the mainstream legal literature. See,
e.g., Ward Edwards & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and their Implications for the
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The burgeoning literature on human judgment, inference, and information
processing discusses proven barriers to accurate judgment that negatively
impinge upon the reliability and validity of human decisionmaking generally
and clinicians' decisionmaking particularly.3 2 In addition, this literature
suggests that the judgments of experienced clinicians are in many cases more
susceptible to error than those of trainees and sometimes even lay
decisionmakers. 3
3
Information processing and decisionmaking are by no means uniquely
professional tasks. "Judgment and choice are pervasive activities,"'34 and
Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 225 (1986) [hereinafter Cognitive Illusions]; David L. Faigman & A.J.
Baglioni, Jr., Bayes' Theorem in the Trial Process, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1988); Steve
Fuller, Playing Without a Full Deck- Scientific Realism and the Cognitive Limits of Legal
Theory, 97 YALE L.J. 549 (1988); Thomas M. Homer & Melvin J. Guyer, Prediction, Preven-
tion, and Clinical Expertise in Child Custody Cases in Which Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse
Have Been Made: I. Predictable Rates of Diagnostic Error in Relation to Various Clinical Deci-
sion-making Strategies, 25 FAM. L.Q. 217 (1991) [hereinafter Homer & Guyer]; Elizabeth F.
Loftus & Willem Wagenaar, Lawyers' Predictions of Success, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 437 (1988);
Peter Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me That?'" Attorney-Client Deliberation Regarding
Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REV. 213, 231-39 (1990); Albert J.
Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. REV. 273 (1989)
[hereinafter Moore]; Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychol-
ogy for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747 (1990); Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics
and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L.
REV. 3 (1990) [hereinafter Psychodynamics]; David Wexler & Robert Schopp, How and When
to Correct for Juror Hindsight Bias in Mental Health Malpractice Litigation: Some Preliminary
Observations, 7 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 485 (1989).
32. "Subjective cognitive operations, whether called attribution, thinking, information
processing, inference, or clinical judgment, occupy a great part of the practicing psychologist's
time-as well as that of most physicians, including but by no means limited to psychiatrists-
and that of many other human service professionals." Robert R. Holt, Judgment, Inference,
and Reasoning in Clinical Perspective, in TURK & SALOVEY, supra note 29, at 233, 234.
Throughout the period of exposure to the patient, practitioners gather data, hypothesize, and
make judgments. The information is not self-evident and must be interpreted. The enormous
amounts of data can only be processed a little at a time. Dennis C. Turk et al., Psychotherapy:
An Information-Processing Perspective, in TURK & SALOVEY, supra note 29, at 1, 2.
Clinicians classify, infer, and predict. Classification involves assigning clients to
diagnostic categories based on either an explicit or an implicit measurement of
one or more attributes.
[T]he clinician must mentally untangle various attributes, sorting the relevant
from the irrelevant, in order to identify properties that bear on the sorts of judg-
ments that need to be made.
The problem of mentally untangling attributes is essentially a problem of se-
lective attention....
Albert F. Smith, Perceiving the Client, in TURK & SALOVEY, supra note 29, at 73, 76-77.
Studies are undertaken from three theoretical perspectives: information processing, social
judgment, and behavioral decision theory. Daniel L. Rock et al., The Study of Clinical Judg-
ment: An Ecological Approach, 7 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 645, 647 (1987) [hereinafter Rock
et al.]. Information processing researchers focus on descriptive rather than normative models
of judgment. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 37-42. Social judgment researchers em-
phasize statistical regression models and are more interested in prediction than description.
See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 71-84. Behavioral decision researchers are prescrip-
tive, developing and evaluating methods for improving the accuracy and efficiency of clinical
judgments. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 65-68, 163-67. See Rock et al. supra, at
647 (collecting references and examples).
33. See infra notes 34-41, 105-06 and accompanying text.
34. ROBIN HOGARTH, JUDGEMENT AND CHOICE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DECISION 1 (2d
ed. 1987) [hereinafter HOGARTH].
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"an inevitable aspect of living."' 35 When faced with data and the need to
make judgments derived from that data, all humans may be characterized as
"intuitive scientists." 36 Information is processed through beliefs, theories,
propositions, and schemas. 37 These knowledge structures enable us to label
and categorize objects rapidly and, in most cases, correctly. However,
humans have limited capabilities to collect and interpret large amounts of
information at any one time. This barrier to accurate decisionmaking is
called "bounded rationality." 38 "Some beliefs, theories, and schemas are rel-
atively poor and inaccurate representations of the external world. More
dangerous, objects and events are not always labeled accurately and some-
times are processed through entirely inappropriate knowledge structures. '39
Given the difficulty in processing large amounts of information at any one
time and such inherent problems as limited short term memory, the decision
outcome is very likely to be flawed.40 The problems are compounded by the
use of a variety of decisionmaking strategies to help deal with what other-
wise would be a "blooming, buzzing confusion."'41 As a result, clinicians
and lay people tend to focus on what they perceive to be the more important
pieces of information, to consider information serially rather than in parallel
35. Id.
36. HUMAN INFERENCE, supra note 29, at 6-8.
37. See id., at 28-41; NEZU & NEzu, supra note 31, at 21.
Schemas are cognitive structures that provide organized representations of various classes of
information or rules. They are derived from the rich store of general knowledge of objects,
people, events, and the characteristic relationships people develop throughout their lives. Ex-
amples include how one behaves at a convention of one's peers and what paranoid
schizophrenics are like. Unfortunately, some schemas are based on faulty data and lead to bad
judgments.
Decisionmaking, however, is not only a cognitive activity. There is ample research showing
the effect of affect (emotion) on mental health professionals' judgments. See Peter Salovey &
Dennis C. Turk, Some Effects of Mood on Clinicians' Memory, in TURK & SALOVEY, supra
note 29, at 107. "Nearly every serious decision a clinician makes-to hospitalize a patient, to
ask a particular question, to refer a client elsewhere-involves an assessment of risk. This
appraisal process seems vulnerable to influence by a clinician's ongoing mood state." Id. at
114. Clinicians who are happy use more intuitive and potentially error-prone strategies and
are more likely to choose simple decisionmaking strategies. Id. at 115-16; Alice M. Isen &
Kimberly A. Daubman, The Influence of Affect on Categorization, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1206 (1984).
38. The term, as originally coined by ALLEN NEWELL & HERBERT A. SIMON, HUMAN
PROBLEM SOLVING 55 (1972), was known as "limited rationality." It is now better known in
the literature as bounded rationality. Hogarth, supra note 34, at 63-66. It has also been la-
beled as "selective attention." WENDELL GARNER, THE PROCESSING OF INFORMATION AND
STRUCTURE (1974).
39. HUMAN INFERENCE, supra note 29, at 7. See Turk, supra note 32, at 5:
One result of information processing guided by knowledge structures like...
schemas ... is the tendency to seek information that confirms prior hypotheses.
Based on theoretical orientation, training, and experience, clinicians develop
schemas about clients according to diagnostic categories. In observing behavior
in the clinical setting, clinicians are more likely to: (a) observe what they expect
to observe (which, in most cases, is pathology); (b) selectively seek theory-con-
firming information; and (c) respond in ways that foster this confirming behav-
ior. Ambiguous information is particularly vulnerable to this bias.
Id. (citations omitted).
40. See NEZU & NEZU, supra note 31, at 17-18.
41. WILLIAM JAMES, PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 488 (New York, H. Holt & Co. 1890).
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or configurally, and to represent reality in highly parsimonious terms. The
paradox is that these very strategies (or heuristics, as they are called in the
literature) often lead to a myriad of inferential errors.42
"Heuristics are information processing strategies which reduce complex
judgmental tasks to a set of simpler operations. These strategies appear to be
innate, automatic processes operating without an act of volition and, pre-
sumably, outside of conscious awareness."' 43 "When assessing the
probability of uncertain empirical facts, people often deviate from the
probability predicted by mathematical and statistical theorems. This dis-
crepancy between individual assessments of probability and statistically pre-
dicted probability is often attributable to the use of simplifying strategies
called 'heuristics.' "44 The strategies that expert clinicians, novices, and lay
people use in arriving at decisions are more similar than different.45
Although these heuristics lead to erroneous decisions in many cases, the use
of these strategies in everyday life produces predominantly more correct de-
cisions than incorrect ones and with great speed and little effort. 46
Perhaps the most well known delineation of judgmental errors comes
from the work of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. 47 They identified
42. HUMAN INFERENCE, supra note 29, at 7. "Errors can occur in both acquiring and
interpreting data." Elstein, supra note 29, at 29. "Rational decision making should obey the
axioms of statistical decision theory .... Yet, there is considerable evidence that certain
heuristic principles widely used in human decision making, which seem intuitively reasonable
and sensible to many people, may be inconsistent with normative theory." Id. at 21 (citation
omitted).
43. Steven D. Hollon & Margaret R. Kriss, Cognitive Factors in Clinical Research and
Practice, 4 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 35, 41 (1984).
44. Moore, supra note 31, at 284.
45. Elstein, supra note 29, at 22-24.
46. See HUMAN INFERENCE, supra note 29, at 18.
47. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973) [hereinafter Availability]; Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, 76 PSYCHOL. BULL. 105
(1971); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics & Bi-
ases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974) [hereinafter Judgment Under Uncertainty]; Psychology of Pre-
diction, supra note 31; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A
Judgment of Representativeness, 3 COGNrIVE PSYCHOL. 430 (1972).
Recently, some critics have questioned the universality and generalizability of heuristic
strategies by showing that some cognitive biases disappear when the form of the question is
changed or the options are modified to yield frequencies rather than probabilities.
I will argue that most so-called errors or cognitive illusions are ... in fact, not
violations of probability theory. In their normative claims, Tversky and
Kahneman, and social psychologists following in their footsteps, have neglected
conceptual distinctions that are fundamental to probability and statistics. Sec-
ondly, I will show that if we pay attention to these conceptual distinctions, we
can make apparently stable "cognitive illusions" disappear, reappear, or even
invert.
Gerd Gigerenzer, How to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond "Heuristics and Biases",
in 2 EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 83, 86 (Wolfgang Stoebe & Miles Hewstone
eds., 1991). The most recent review of the decisionmaking literature acknowledged that deci-
sions are not procedurally invariant and can change as the result of different representations of
the same choice problem. See Payne et al., supra note 31, at 91-98. Nevertheless, "the ques-
tion is no longer whether biases exist, but under what conditions relevant information will or
will not be used to construct a response to a probability judgment task." Id. at 103. The
conflict between the work of Kahneman and Tversky and such critics as Gigerenzer is more
generally one between the Bayesians, represented by the former, and frequentists, represented
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three strategic principles that humans, including mental health clinicians,
commonly use to simplify complex decisionmaking tasks. They are known
as the availability, representativeness, and anchoring heuristics.
The availability heuristic biases estimates of the frequency of a class or the
probability of an event by the ease with which instances of that class or event
can be recalled. 48 "For example, one may assess the divorce rate in a given
community by recalling divorces among one's acquaintances; . .. and one
may estimate the probability that a violent person will 'see' beasts of prey in
a Rorschach card by assessing the strength of association between violence
and beasts of prey." '49
To the extent that one's use of the availability heuristic matches objective
reality, it can lead to quick and accurate judgments; but when that match is
faulty, it can lead to erroneous diagnostic and treatment formulations. "Cat-
egories that have been employed recently and/or frequently show enhanced
cognitive accessibility and have increased probability of being employed in
subsequent categorization and judgment." 50 For example, a patient com-
plaining of sadness is more likely to be assessed as a suicide risk if the clini-
cian had a recent case involving a patient who actually committed suicide
but had been evaluated initially as a low risk for self-destruction. Similarly,
a therapist may institute a particular treatment with a patient experiencing a
panic disorder because that treatment worked with a prior anxious patient.
Likewise, a diagnostic or treatment decision may result from particular cate-
gories that are familiar and chronically accessible. For example, specific
types of clinical practices tend to be characterized by clients suffering from
particular forms of psychopathology. Thus, if clinicians are repeatedly ex-
posed to a particular type of disorder, that diagnostic category may show a
by the latter. Bayesians think in terms of probabilities; frequentists think in terms of relative
frequencies. "Bayesian and frequentistic approaches lead to quite different conclusions about
the rules for statistical inference, and statisticians of these persuasions have engaged in running
arguments since the early 1960's." Cognitive Illusions, supra note 31, at 228. For a brief dis-
cussion of Bayesian approaches to decisionmaking, see infra notes 65-68 and accompanying
text.
48. NEZU & NEZU, supra note 31, at 19.
49. Availability, supra note 47, at 208.
[I]f one had to judge the chances of a discharged mental patient being danger-
ous, one might only access dramatic memories of particular discharged patients
(e.g., memories of their violent behavior (sic)) presumably because such memo-
ries are more available. If so, then one would judge a particular patient as hav-
ing a greatly inflated chance of being dangerous, ignoring data which suggest, in
general, that discharged mental patients are most likely to be docile and non-
violent.
Ben Harris & John H. Harvey, Attribution Theory: From Phenomenal Causality to the Intuitive
Social Scientist and Beyond, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ORDINARY EXPLANATIONS OF SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR 57, 83 (Charles Antaki ed., 1981). Similarly, "people believe that psychotic indi-
viduals are prone to extreme violence simply because they can recall more easily an example of
a violent psychotic (e.g., Charles Manson.. .), even though the prevalence of violent behavior
by emotionally disturbed individuals is actually quite low." Turk, supra note 32, at 1, 6. A
current review suggests that there may be a consistent, though modest, positive relationship
between mental disorders and the occurrence of violence. See John Monahan, Mental Disorder
and Violent Behavior: Perceptions and Evidence, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 511 (1992).
50. Mark Snyder & Cynthia J. Thomsen, Interactions between Therapists and Clients: Hy-
pothesis Testing and Behavioral Confirmation, in TURK & SALOVEY, supra note 29, at 133.
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relatively permanent increase in availability. 51
A number of factors can contribute erroneously to the availability of infor-
mation. Two of the more well studied factors are vividness and illusory cor-
relation. "Vivid information is more likely to be stored and remembered
than pallid information is. Information that is easily remembered is by defi-
nition more likely to be retrieved at some later date and therefore to affect
later inferences."' 52 For example, in one study mock jurors heard arguments
concerning the fitness of a mother to be awarded custody of her seven-year-
old son. Half of the jurors heard evidence with all favorable arguments
presented in vivid form and all unfavorable arguments in non-vivid form.
The other half heard the arguments in reverse. Jurors remembered more
vivid than non-vivid arguments, and those who heard the favorable argu-
ments in vivid form judged the mother to be a more fit parent than did jurors
who heard the unfavorable arguments in vivid form. The vividness effect
held true under conditions of both immediate and delayed (by 48 hours)
judgment. 53
Perhaps more relevant is the influence of preconceived notions or expec-
tancies, usually labeled in the decisionmaking literature as illusory correla-
tion,54 which is defined as "a report by an observer of a correlation between
two classes of events which in reality (a) are not correlated, (b) are corre-
lated to a lesser extent than reported, or (c) are correlated in the opposite
51. Id. See Tony E. Higgins et al., Individual Construct Accessibility and Subjective Im-
pressions and Recall, 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 35 (1982). "[A] clinician who
works in a state mental hospital might overestimate the number of paranoid schizophrenics in
the clinical population and be more likely to overdiagnose paranoid schizophrenia simply be-
cause specific paranoid schizophrenics are so easily called to mind in that setting." Turk,
supra note 32, at 6. "Furthermore, since theoretical orientations differ in the extent to which
they emphasize particular forms of pathology, clinicians with different theoretical perspectives
may systematically differ in the types of diagnostic categories that are chronically most accessi-
ble to them." Snyder & Thomsen, supra note 50, at 133.
52. HUMAN INFERENCE, supra note 29, at 45 (emphasis deleted).
53. Jonathan Shedler & Melvin Manis, Can the Availability Heuristic Explain Vividness
Effects?, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 26 (1986). See also Robert M. Reyes et al.,
Judgmental Biases Resulting from Differing Availabilities of Arguments, 39 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 2 (1980) (mock jurors who read prosecution arguments in vivid form and
defense arguments in non-vivid form judged defendant charged with drunk driving more
harshly than those in contrasting experimental group, though only in the delayed recall condi-
tion). However, "[s]ince most juries render a verdict long after the evidence has been
presented, the findings from the delayed rating of guilt would seem to be most applicable to
normal legal proceedings." Arkes, supra note 31, at 434-35. Contra Shelley E. Taylor & Su-
zanne C. Thompson, Stalking the Elusive "Vividness" Effect, 89 PSYCHOL. REV. 155 (1982)
(there is little support for the proposition that vividly presented information is more persuasive
than non-vividly presented information).
An experienced advocate knowledgeable about the availability heuristic can use this infor-
mation in preparing and examining experts:
Expert witnesses reporting scientific and/or statistical data are likely to have less
impact on a fact finder than does a person who reports a case study, relates a
compelling personal experience, or offers anecdotal evidence. That which is
more concrete, vivid, emotion arousing, and otherwise more salient will be more
accessible when a fact finder ponders the decision to be made.
Saks & Kidd, supra note 31, at 137.
54. Arkes, supra note 31, at 434.
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direction of that which is reported."55 In the seminal studies,5 6 naive lay
subjects and experienced clinicians were provided with psychiatric diagnoses
and test responses from figure drawings or Rorschach cards. The subjects
were asked to estimate the correlations between certain diagnoses and test
responses, for example, emphasis of paranoid patients on eyes in the draw-
ings or perceptions by gay men of feminine clothing in Rorschach ink blots.
Although the pairings of diagnoses and test responses were done randomly,
both naive and clinical subjects significantly overestimated the co-occurrence
between stereotypical but invalid signs on the tests and diagnostic character-
istics of patients. In effect, decisionmakers "perceived" these stereotypical
correlations even though no evidence for them existed. In fact, these illusory
correlations were so persistent that they were evoked even when the popular
but invalid sign was paired randomly with a symptom or was actually corre-
lated negatively with it and the unpopular but valid sign was paired 100% of
the time with the same symptom. 5 7 The phenomenon occurred more often
as the information confronting the decisionmaker increased, 58 and the influ-
ence of these preconceived notions appeared resistant to training specifically
designed to reduce illusory correlation.5 9
The representativeness heuristic is used by decisionmakers to determine
the probability that an individual is a member of a particular group, (for
example whether Patient X can be classified within a certain diagnostic en-
tity) or that an individual is likely to engage in a particular behavior (for
example, whether Defendant Y will commit acts that constitute a continuing
danger to society). 6° In such cases, decisionmakers select outcomes based on
55. Saks & Kidd, supra note 31, at 139; Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 47, at
1128.
56. Loren J. Chapman & Jean P. Chapman, Genesis of Popular but Erroneous
Psychodiagnostic Observations, 72 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 193 (1967) [hereinafter Genesis];
Loren J. Chapman & Jean P. Chapman, Illusory Correlation as an Obstacle to the Use of Valid
Psychodiagnostic Signs, 74 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 271 (1969) [hereinafter Illusory Correla-
tion]; Loren J. Chapman, Illusory Correlation in Observational Report, 6 J. VERBAL LEARNING
& VERBAL BEHAV. 151 (1967).
57. See Illusory Correlation, supra note 56, at 271; Genesis, supra note 56, at 193.
58. Robert J. Lueger & Thomas P. Petzel, Illusory Correlation in Clinical Judgment: Ef-
fect of Amount of Information to be Processed, 47 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1120
(1979).
59. See Richard M. Kurtz & Sol L. Garfield, Illusory Correlation: A Further Exploration
of Chapman's Paradigm, 46 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1009 (1978). "One tech-
nique that has proven to be absolutely worthless is telling people what a particular bias is and
then telling them not to be influenced by it." Hal R. Arkes, Impediments to Accurate Clinical
Judgment and Possible Ways to Minimize Their Impact, 49 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 323, 326 (1981) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Impediments]; accord Baruch Fis-
choff, Perceived Informativeness of Facts, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUMAN PERCEP-
TION & PERFORMANCE 349 (1977); Jerry S. Wiggins, Clinical and Statistical Prediction:
Where We Are and Where Do We Want to Go?, 1 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 3, 16 (1981)("Explaining a bias to judges and then telling them not to be influenced by it, is absolutely
worthless as a training technique"). The presence of illusory correlation in clinical decision-
making has been replicated and judged to be robust. Stephen L. Golding & Leonard G. Rorer,
Illusory Correlation and Subjective Judgment, 80 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 249 (1972); B.
James Starr & Edward S. Katkin, The Clinician as an Aberrant Actuary: Illusory Correlation
and the Incomplete Sentences Blank, 74 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 670 (1969).
60. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 l(b)(2) (Vernon 1981) (mandating jury
should consider the threat to society in sentencing stage); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 267-73
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the essential features of the evidence. 6 I Thus, those judging "assess the de-
gree to which the salient features of the object are representative of, or simi-
lar to, the features presumed to be characteristic of the category. ' 62
Representativeness may be useful when in reality a particular characteris-
tic truly resembles a larger category or schema (for example, a suspicious,
guarded, and grandiose person is diagnosed as having paranoid symptoms).
Certain factors exist, however, such as ignorance or misuse of base rates, the
illusion of validity, and the failure to consider statistical regression, which
affect the likelihood of outcomes but not their representativeness. 63 When
these factors are ignored, they lead to erroneous judgments or predictions, as
when an acutely psychotic person presented for civil commitment is pre-
dicted to be violent.6 4
Perhaps the best known factor that does not affect representativeness, but
which should affect predictions of probability, is base rates, that is, frequen-
cies of things to be identified or predicted or prior probabilities of outcomes.
For example, if a psychiatrist were told that a patient was a major risk taker
and asked to guess whether the patient was a professional sky diver or a
lawyer, the representativeness heuristic would lead the clinician to conclude
the patient was a sky diver. However, given the fact that there are a great
many more lawyers than sky divers, insensitivity to base rates may interfere
with arriving at the proper judgment. 65 To comport with the findings of
(1976) (discussing the jury's task of determining whether defendant would commit violence
constituting a threat to society and of imposing the death penalty based on such a prediction).
61. Psychology of Prediction, supra note 31, at 237-38. "The representative heuristic in-
volves an assessment of the probability of an event by judging the degree to which that event
corresponds to an appropriate mental model such as a sample and a population, an instance
and a category, or an act or an actor." Payne et al., supra note 31, at 103.
62. HUMAN INFERENCE, supra note 29, at 24. "mhe representative heuristic ... holds
that the likelihood that event A belongs to class X is equal to the degree to which A resembles
or is similar to X." Moore, supra note 31, at 284-85.
63. Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 47, at 1124-27.
64. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Repre-
sentativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430 (1972) (discussing the use of subjective probabilities
and representativeness); Saks & Kidd, supra note 31, at 133 (discussing the danger of errone-
ous predictions).
Presumed familiarity with a particular clinical problem, patient type, or proce-
dure, may... lead to increasingly scripted thinking and behavior by the clini-
cian .... While scripted behavior in many ways may be more efficient, it also
may be more subject to inaccuracy .... [O]nce faulty causal attributions (or
diagnostic labels) are made, contradictory (accurate) information may be dis-
counted; self-fulfilling prophecies may then confirm the faulty diagnosis, and
treatment may proceed inappropriately.
John S. Jordan et al., Attributional Biases in Clinical Decision Making, in TURK & SALOVEY,
supra note 29, at 90, 99.
65. The classic example involves judging the probability that a blue cab rather than a
green cab was the cause of a hit-and-run accident at night when it is known that 85% of the
cabs in the city are green and 15% blue, and a witness who identified the cab as blue, when
tested with a sample of equal number of green and blue cabs under appropriate visibility condi-
tions, made the correct identification 80% of the time. The typical subject judged the
probability of the true perpetrator to be the blue cab 80% of the time. Given the base rate
information (prior probabilities) and the specific case data (posterior odds), the correct
probability is 41%. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Causal Schemes in Judgments
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cognitive psychology, the clinician who wishes to arrive at the most probable
diagnosis must know:
(a) the frequency of occurrence of a diagnostic sign and (b) a disorder
in the population being observed (i.e., the "base rates"), as well as (c)
the probability that someone with the disorder in question will or will
not exhibit the sign, and (d) the probability that normal individuals will
also exhibit the sign. 66
The basic problem with making probability judgments on the basis of
representative characteristics is that the schema accessed may in fact be
less probable, given the characteristic, than one not accessed, the reason
being that the schema not accessed has a much greater extent in the
world than the accessed one.67
Unfortunately, only when no additional information is given other than base
rates, will decisionmakers rely on that information, but when additional
clinical data are introduced, even if worthless, the base rate is seemingly
disregarded and the representativeness heuristic again controls the
judgment.68
Under Uncertainty, in PROGRESS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 49 (Martin Fishbein ed., 1980) (cal-
culating probabilities and discussing the neglect of base rates).
For the technical details of how such calculations are made, see HOGARTH, supra note 34, at
235-41. Such calculations are based on the use of Bayes' Theorem or Bayesian analysis. See
THOMAS BAYES, AN ESSAY TOWARDS SOLVING A PROBLEM IN THE DOCTRINE OF CHANCES
(1763). "Bayes's theorem specifies that proper inferences from fallible evidence should com-
bine that evidence with prior probabilities, that is, the opinions held by the person making the
inference before the new evidence becomes available." Cognitive Illusions, supra note 31, at
232. Impediments, supra note 59, at 327-29; NEZU & NEZU, supra note 31, at 15-16; Lyn D.
Pankoff & Harry V. Roberts, Bayesian Synthesis of Clinical and Statistical Prediction, 70
PSYCHOL. BULL. 762 (1968) [hereinafter Bayesian Synthesis]; William B. Schwartz et al., Deci-
sion Analysis and Clinical Judgment, 55 AM. J. MED. 459 (1973).
66. Elstein, supra note 29, at 32. See JERRY S. WIGGINS, PERSONALITY AND PREDIC-
TION: PRINCIPLES OF PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT (1988). For example, consider a new diag-
nostic instrument that is 95% positive for known depressed males and 33% positive for non-
depressed males, creating a true positive hit rate about three times the false positive rate. As-
suming the general prevalence of clinical depression for males is 5%, if the instrument is given
to a randomly selected man and the results are positive, clinicians may be asked what the
probability is that the patient is actually depressed. A majority of clinicians gauge the
probability value to be 65% or greater. But, with the proper calculation of base rates and case
specific information, the true probability is only 13%. See NEZU & NEZU, supra note 31, at
14-15.
67. Robyn M. Dawes, Representative Thinking in Clinical Judgment, 6 CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. REV. 425, 429 (1986). See David Faust, What If We Had Really Listened? Present
Reflections on Altered Pasts, in I THINKING CLEARLY ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY 185 (Dante
Cicchetti & William M. Gove eds., 1990):
For example, compared to predictions founded on the base rates, a sign (or set
of signs) that achieves 75% accuracy will exceed base-rate predictions if the
event of interest occurs 65% of the time (and thus one achieved 65% accuracy
by always guessing "yea"). However, the sign will fall below base-rate accuracy
if the event occurs 85% of the time (and one could thereby achieve 85% accu-
racy by always guessing "yea").
Id. at 186. Thus, simply using a valid assessment instrument or a set of valid diagnostic signs
is not enough. The use of these valid indicators "could still decrease accuracy relative to that
achieved by base-rate predictions. The sign(s) must also exceed base-rate accuracy." Id.
68. Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 47, at 1124-25; Arkes, supra note 31, at 430-
32; Saks & Kidd, supra note 31, at 133-34. "[B]ase rates are often neglected in favor of individ-
ualizing information, presumably because unique case material is more vivid and memorable."
Elstein, supra note 29, at 33. See Richard E. Nisbet et al., Popular Induction: Information is
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The illusion of validity occurs when decisionmakers make stereotypical
predictions, 69 and the evidence on which they make their predictions "is
scanty, unreliable, or outdated."'70 For example, psychiatrists and human
resources managers responsible for selecting or promoting employees rely
heavily on their own interviews and express great confidence in their judg-
ments even when they recognize that "interviews are notoriously fallible."'7'
One of the major determinants of a decisionmaker's confidence in predic-
tion is the internal consistency of the data. "[Piaradoxically, characteristics
of information that inspire confidence are often inversely related to the pre-
dictive accuracy of that information."' 72 For example, clinicians using tests
that are highly correlated with each other are likely to express more confi-
dence in their predictions about the test taker's behavior than when they use
uncorrelated tests, even if they are told that both sets of tests are equally
predictive of the outcome.73 If the data used in drawing a conclusion are
highly correlated, the decisionmaker's confidence in the stereotype's accu-
racy is greatly heightened. Unfortunately, this pattern of consistency will
often be the result of redundant information, rather than additional informa-
tion.74 "[A]n elementary result in the statistics of correlation asserts that,
given input variables of stated validity, a prediction based on several such
inputs can achieve higher accuracy when they are independent of each other
than when they are redundant or correlated. '7 5 Thus, decisionmakers often
express great confidence in their judgments although they rely on data that
decrease accuracy. 7
6
Not Always Informative, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 113 (John Carroll & J. Payne
eds., 1976). However, "base rates are sometimes taken into account: when the link between
base rate and target event is causal, when base rates appear relevant, when the base rates relate
to individuating information, and when both diagnostic and base rate information are essen-
tially statistical." Cognitive Illusions, supra note 31, at 233. "[S]ophisticated awareness and
use of base rates is a key element of what we call expertise." Id. at 234.
69. Saks & Kidd, supra note 31, at 135.
70. Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 47, at 1126. "The unwarranted confidence
which is produced by a good fit between the predicted outcome and the input information may
be called the illusion of validity." Id.
71. Psychology of Prediction, supra note 31, at 249. Thus, the "illusion persists even when
the judge is aware of the factors that limit the accuracy of his prediction .... The continued
reliance on the clinical interview... despite repeated demonstrations of its inadequacy, amply
attests to the strength of this effect." Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 47, at 1126.
For a discussion of psychiatrists, see Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (allowing testi-
mony of psychiatrists despite the chance such testimony could be unreliable); James Wyda &
Bert Black, Psychiatric Predictions and the Death Penalty: An Unconstitutional Sword for the
Prosecution but a Constitutional Shield for the Defense, 7 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 505 (1989) (dis-
cussing testimony of mental health professionals in capital cases) [hereinafter Wyda & Black].
For its application to employee selection, see Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S.
977 (1988) (discussing the use of subjective judgment of employees rather than formal selection
criteria); Donald N. Bersoff, Should Subjective Employment Devices be Scrutinized? It's Ele-
mentary My Dear Ms. Watson, 43 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1016 (1988)(discussing the use of inter-
views and other "subjective evaluation devices" in the job context).
72. Hogarth, supra note 34, at 39.
73. Psychology of Prediction, supra note 31, at 249.
74. HUMAN INFERENCE, supra note 29, at 160; Saks & Kidd, supra note 31, at 136.
75. Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 47, at 1126.
76. For other research on confidence of judgments in lay and clinical settings, see Hillel J.
Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Confidence in Judgment. Persistence of the Illusion of Validity,
1992]
SMU LAW REVIEW
When decisionmakers have to predict future performance from some ex-
isting data, they often make errors because they failed to understand regres-
sion to the mean, another variable influencing the use of representative
thinking. The principle of regression to the mean states that:
Events that are extreme on some dimensions will, on the average, be
less extreme when they recur, when they are reassessed, or when they
are assessed on any other dimension. Events or objects that appear to be
extreme on some dimension on the basis of preliminary information or
on the basis of a limited sample of evidence, will, on the average, prove
to be less extreme when all of the relevant evidence becomes available. 77
Examples abound in everyday life-very intelligent parents have less intelli-
gent children; rookie "phenoms" have sophomore slumps; students who
score well below average on a mid-term examination score more closely to
the average on the final; law school graduates near the top of their class are
not as outstanding in their professional lives. Regression is incompatible
with the representative heuristic because the heuristic implies that a pre-
dicted outcome is maximally representative of the data that went into the
prediction. However, "regression effects typically violate the intuition that
the predicted outcome should be maximally representative of the input
information."78
In the absence of other data, the best prediction is the average or mean
because it is the point in a distribution that is closest to the largest number of
observations. 79 The average is the base line from which decisionmakers
should deviate only to the extent that the risks of such deviations are likely
to be compensated by the diagnosticity of the other information one has
85 PSYCHOL. REV. 395 (1978); James Q. Holsopple & John G. Phelan, The Skills of Clinicians
in Analysis of Projective Tests, 10 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 307 (1954); Asher Koriat et al., Rea-
sons for Confidence, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING AND MEMORY 107
(1980); Stuart Oskamp, Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgments, 29 J. CONSULTING
PSYCHOL. 261 (1965) (volume of patient information does not significantly improve accuracy
in predicting and describing behavior). For a brief review, see Robyn M. Dawes et al., Clinical
Versus Actuarial Judgment, 243 SCIENCE 1668, 1672 (1989) [hereinafter Dawes et al.]. "When
the clinician misinterprets contrary evidence as indicative of judgmental accuracy, confidence
will obviously be inflated. Research shows that judges are typically more confident than their
accuracy warrants. In one study ... most clinicians were quite confident in their diagnosis
although not one was correct." Id. Given the complexity of mental health decisionmaking,
most relevant is the finding that "people are much less likely to be overconfident about easy
probability judgments than about difficult ones." Cognitive Illusions, supra note 31, at 239.
77. HUMAN INFERENCE, supra note 29, at 160.
78. Psychology of Prediction, supra note 31, at 250; Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra
note 47, at 1126-27.
79. "Sampling theory in inferential statistics suggests that, the larger the sample size from
which a piece of data is generated, the more generalizable that information is to the entire
relevant population." NEZU & NEZU, supra note 31, at 22. "This fundamental notion of
statistics is evidently not part of people's repertoire of intuitions." Judgment Under Uncer-
tainty, supra note 47, at 1125. For a classic example, see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102
(1970) in which the Supreme Court concluded there would only be a "negligible" difference in
the number of viewpoints represented in six and twelve member juries. But, if jurors are ran-
domly selected from a venire composed of 90% of one group and 10% of the other, 72% of
twelve-person juries would include at least one minority member but only 47% of six-person
juries would include one such member. "In this example, the 'negligible' difference is 25 per-
cent." Saks & Kidd, supra note 31, at 135; see Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in
the Law of Small Numbers, 76 PSYCHOL. BULL. 105 (1971).
[Vol. 46
NONLEGAL DECISIONMAKERS
about the patient.80 But if clinicians base a prediction about future perform-
ance on one test or on the basis of faulty data,81 they are likely to conclude
that future performance will be highly correlated with past performance, an
outcome that violates the principle of regression to the mean. Given "that
substantial research has documented the tendency of mental health profes-
sionals, regardless of their level of experience or theoretical orientation, to
form clinical impressions very quickly,"'82 such errors are made with rela-
tively high frequency, particularly because initial clinical impressions are
highly resistant to change.83 Similar effects occur in therapy. For example,
exceptionally good performance may be rewarded or reinforced by a behav-
ior therapist with the expectation that the reward will continue to lead to
high performance. The principle of regression to the mean, however, should
lead the therapist to expect less effective performance on the next trial. The
failure to understand this phenomenon may lead the therapist to abandon
the use of the reward.84 Thus, insensitivity to sample size and ignorance of
regression can lead therapists to make errors concerning prognosis and the
efficacy of a particular treatment.85
The phenomenon discussed above is closely related to the final heuristic of
anchoring, "a shortcut method of estimation or prediction involving situa-
tions in which final decisions are based more on initial impressions than on
80. "The tendency to be insufficiently regressive in number prediction [e.g., what are the
chances of a patient becoming violent?] closely corresponds, logically, to the tendency to ig-
nore base rates in category prediction [e.g., what is the likelihood that Patient A is a soci-
opath?]." HUMAN INFERENCE, supra note 29, at 151.
81. Reliance on tests with a great deal of unreliability, Le., where repeated administrations
yield scores that fluctuate widely, will lead to particularly bad predictions. "In general, unreli-
able sources exhibit more extreme values than reliable sources. Thus, in these circumstances, a
judgmental strategy that matches predictions to inputs such as test scores is particularly vul-
nerable to bias due to the presence of regression effects." HOGARTH, supra note 34, at 28.
82. Snyder & Thomsen, supra note 50, at 131. See Eugene F. Gauron & John K. Dickin-
son, The Influence of Seeing the Patient First on Diagnostic Decision Making in Psychiatry, 126
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 199 (1969) (initial diagnostic impressions made within the first 30-60
seconds of observing the patient); Myron G. Sandifer et al., The Psychiatric Interview: The
Impact of the First Three Minutes, 126 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 968, 968 (1970) (first three min-
utes of observation are important and may have a decisive impact upon the final diagnostic
decision).
83. "[I]nitial evaluative impressions of the client tend to persist." Snyder & Thomsen,
supra note 50, at 140. See Arthur C. Houts & Mercedes Galante, The Impact of Evaluative
Disposition and Subsequent Information on Clinical Impressions, 3 J. Soc. & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 201 (1985); Paul E. Meehl, The Cognitive Activity of the Clinician, 15 AM. PsY-
CHOLOGIST 19 (1960) (therapists' impressions formed by the fourth session not significantly
different from those at the 24th session).
84. "As in other cases of repeated performance, an improvement will usually follow poor
performance and a deterioration will usually follow an outstanding performance." Judgment
Under Uncertainty, supra note 47, at 1127.
85. Just as diagnosticians form impressions quickly, so do therapists who are quick to
classify patients "good" or "bad" after very few contacts. See, e.g., Franklyn N. Arnhoff,
Some Factors Influencing the Unreliability of Clinical Judgments, 10 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL.
272 (1954); Snyder & Thomsen, supra note 50, at 139-40. The phenomenon may lead to
particularly pernicious decisions as when poor initial progress in psychotherapy may lead to
the prediction that verbal or behavioral forms of intervention are not valid for a particular




subsequent information. '8 6 The initial value from which decisionmakers be-
gin is highly determinative of the final answer. This initial value may be
suggested by the formulation of the problem, may be given to the deci-
sionmaker, or may be the result of a hurried, incomplete computation.8 7
Theoretically, in the clinical context, new information leads to revisions
and refinements. Unfortunately, in practice, the initial decisions often are
not corrected by new information.88 For example, estimates of pathology
may vary as a result of the initial information the clinician receives,8 9 or
"[c]linicians may fail to see improvement in a client's condition because
they are anchored to an initial judgment of the client's mental state.
Alternatively, clinicians might overvalue information revealed about a
client during the intake process (at which point exposure to the client is
minimal) and ignore subsequent information revealed during therapy
(by which time, knowledge of the client is more extensive and
reliable). 90
Subsumed under the anchoring heuristic is the bias caused by incorrectly
86. NEZU & NEZU, supra note 31, at 23.
87. See Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 47, at 1128. The classic illustration of
anchoring bias resulting from partial computation is when subjects are asked to estimate in five
seconds the product of either of these two sequences of numbers: 8 X 7 X 6 X 5 X 4 X 3 X
2 X 1 or the reverse-i x 2, etc. Subjects' median estimate for the ascending sequence was
512; for the descending sequence, 2250-in each case, a gross underestimate. The correct
answer is 40,320 for both. Id. This is known as insufficient adjustment from the initial anchor.
See Paul Slovic & Sarah Lichenstein, Comparison of Bayesian and Regression Approaches to the
Study of Information Processing in Judgment, 6 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 649
(1971). "Anchoring and adjustment is a general judgment process in which an initially gener-
ated or given response serves as an anchor and other information is used to adjust to that
response. It is generally assumed that the adjustment is insufficient." Payne et al., supra note
31, at 103.
88. Turk, supra note 32, at 9.
89. See James Bieri et al., Anchoring Effects in Sequential Clinical Judgments, 67 J. AB-
NORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 616 (1963) (significant differences in estimates of pathology found
in identical cases as a function of order of presentation of clinical information); Myrna L.
Friedlander & Susan J. Stockman, Anchoring and Publicity Effects in Clinical Judgment, 39 J.
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 637 (1983) (robust anchoring bias among psychologists, psychiatrists,
and social workers in their estimates of pathology and prognosis of hypothetical patients).
90. Turk, supra note 32, at 7. See, e.g., Gary E. Swan & Marian L. MacDonald, Behavior
Therapy in Practice.- A National Survey of Behavior Therapists, 9 BEHAV. THERAPY 799 (1978)
(two-thirds of over 300 behavior therapists said that only one-to-two sessions needed to con-
ceptualize clients' problems). See also supra notes 82-83, 85.
A phenomenon related to anchoring bias is known as convergence bias. "Early convergence
[of data] can decrease judgment accuracy when a therapist confirms a hypothesis early in
treatment and is unwilling to modify this hypothesis when faced with contradictory data."
Rock et al., supra note 32, at 649. See also Philip A. Hirsch & Gerald L. Stone, Cognitive
Strategies and the Client Conceptualization Hypothesis, 30 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 566
(1983) (early convergence more frequent in highly experienced therapists); Steven D. Hollon
& Margaret R. Kriss, Cognitive Factors in Clinical Research and Practice, 4 CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. REV. 35, 40 (1984):
When an individual is presented with novel environmental information that is
discrepant with an existing schema, one of two outcomes may occur. On the
one hand, the stimulus may be altered or assimilated such that it becomes con-
sistent with the preexisting schema. Conversely, the schema itself may be modi-
fied so as to accommodate the discrepant information .... Most of the literature
in cognitive psychology seems to suggest that the process of assimilation occurs
more frequently than accommodation. Assimilation is particularly likely to lead
to inaccurate [or] nonnormative cognitive products, since incoming information
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evaluating the probability of conjunctive and disjunctive events. 91 The phe-
nomenon can be illustrated by the following example: Professor X was an
excellent student in law school, though somewhat withdrawn and suspicious.
After clerking, he was hired as an assistant professor at a respected law
school that placed a great deal of emphasis on scholarship. Professor X ex-
perienced significant pressure in meeting his teaching obligations, began to
believe that his faculty colleagues were saying negative things about his in-
ability to complete a first draft of a law review article, and became increas-
ingly reclusive. He started outpatient psychotherapy, but when he started to
hear voices telling him that his dean was purposely blocking his writing ef-
forts, he was hospitalized during the school's summer recess and placed on
antipsychotic medication.
One can ask what is the probability that Professor X is: (a) highly intelli-
gent; (b) a highly intelligent paranoid schizophrenic; and (c) a highly intelli-
gent paranoid schizophrenic who will not attain tenure at his law school.92
If readers are similar to most respondents to these kinds of problems, they
will have ascribed greater probability to (c) than to (a) or to (a) and (b)
combined, 93 because decisionmakers "tend to overestimate the probability
of the occurrence of conjunctive events and to underestimate the probability
of disjunctive events." '94
This failure to adjust from the initial anchoring probability results from a
violation of an elementary law of probability: "the probability of a conjunc-
tion (A & B) cannot exceed the probability of its constituents. "95 In other
words, "compound events cannot be more likely than the least probable of
the simpler events that constitute the compound."'96 Yet, clinicians, as well
as other decisionmakers, tend to overpredict outcomes in scenarios, such as
the example presented herein, when they include both a possible cause and
is likely to be selectively processed in a fashion which favors consistency with
internal beliefs over fidelity to external realities.
Id. (citations omitted)
91. Some authors view the conjunctive/disjunctive bias as an example of the representa-
tive heuristic. See Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 47, at 1128-29. See, e.g., HUMAN
INFERENCE, supra note 29, at 146; Hogarth, supra note 34, at 47-51. The originators of the
concept of anchoring place it within that heuristic.
92. This example is suggested by similar problems developed by Robyn M. Dawes, Repre-
sentative Thinking in Clinical Judgment, 6 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 425, 426 (1986); see also
HOGARTH, supra note 34, at 38, 47; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional versus
Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REV.
293, 297 (1983).
93. See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., Cognitive Processes and Societal Risk Taking, in COGNI-
TIVE AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 165 (John Carroll & John Payne eds., 1976). In their study
using a similar scenario, subjects estimated the probability of event (a) as .21, the probability of
(a) and (b) as .39, and the probability of (a), (b), and (c) as .42.
94. Saks & Kidd, supra note 31, at 142. The original experiment from which this finding
was derived comes from Maya Bar-Hillel, On the Subjective Probability of Compound Events, 9
ORGAN. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 396 (1973).
95. Arkes, supra note 31, at 443.
96. HUMAN INFERENCE, supra note 29, at 146. "[J]oint probability of two events cannot
exceed the smaller of the probabilities associated with two events. Moreover, this restriction




an outcome, than when the scenarios involve the outcome alone.97 The use
of additional clinical information may lead the decisionmaker to make more
confident and probable estimates of outcomes (such as suicide or violence to
others) than is warranted because there appears to be a causal coherence to
the series of derived information. 98
In sum, "[a]bundant evidence from psychological research . . . suggests
that in many contexts decision makers' intuitive, common-sense judgments
depart markedly and lawfully (in the scientific sense) from the actual
probabilities." 99 These incorrect intuitive judgments result from the use of
simplifying heuristic strategies in all situations where decisionmakers' cogni-
tive capacities cannot otherwise efficiently process information. As the re-
search illustrates, judgmental errors are not limited to lay decisionmakers
but have been observed in the work of mental health professionals arriving at
diagnoses, formulating treatment regimens, and predicting behavior. 100
Reviews of research by a variety of scholars of the efficacy of clinical deci-
sionmaking come to the same general conclusion: "The results of studies in
which level of performance on clinical judgment tasks was examined have
been not only disappointing but often alarming."'1' For example, one study
97. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning: The
Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REV. 293 (1983); HOGARTH, supra
note 34, at 48-50.
98. HOGARTH, supra note 34, at 49. "Thus the outcomes of long, detailed, and coherent
scenarios may often be judged as more likely than an assessment of the components of such
scenarios would warrant." Id.
99. Saks & Kidd, supra note 31, at 127.
100. "The reliance on heuristics and the prevalence of biases are not restricted to laymen."
Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 47, at 1130. To paraphrase a summary of the clinical
literature: (a) Clinicians are probably no better or worse than lay people in forecasting out-
comes; (b) there is nothing special about clinicians' judgmental processes, and they suffer from
the same shortcomings as other professional decisionmakers like physicians and intelligence
analysts; and (c) all decisionmakers' abilities to make judgments that comport with the formal
rules of scientific inference is below average ("C-"). Jerry S. Wiggins, Clinical and Statistical
Prediction: Where We Are and Where Do We Go from Here?, 1 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 3,
14 (1981). Even this rather lengthy exegesis on heuristics does not do justice to the extensive
findings from the judgment, information processing, and decisionmaking literature. Readers
are urged to refer to the references cited herein, particularly those listed in note 31.
101. Faust, supra note 31, at 420. "[R]eviews of clinical judgment research frequently con-
clude that clinical and counseling psychologists often are inaccurate in making instrumental
judgments (e.g., diagnosis, formulation, prognosis, assessment of outcome)." Rock et al.,
supra note 32, at 646. Similar results have been found for psychologists who work in schools.
See Paul A. McDermott, Sources of Error in the Psychoeducational Diagnosis of Handicapped
Children, 19 J. SCHOOL PSYCHOL. 31 (1981). "In view of the importance of these judgmental
activities, it is very disturbing that the experimental literature indicates that performance in
interviewing and judgmental tasks tends to be poor .... [T]here are many studies . . . sug-
gesting that the clinical judgment of psychologists is no better than that of, say, physical scien-
tists; and that psychologists with clinical training have no better judgment than those without
it." Fraser N. Watts, Clinical Judgment and Clinical Training, 53 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCHOL.
95, 95 (1980). This negative evaluation is by no means restricted to clinical psychologists. The
judgmental ability of psychiatrists is as poor, or worse, than psychologists. See, e.g., Hans Ueli
Fisch et al., On Evaluating the Severity of Depression: An Experimental Study of Psychiatrists,
140 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 378 (1982); William M. Grove et al., Reliability Studies of Psychiat-
ric Diagnosis, 38 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 408 (1981); Joel Yager, Psychiatric Eclecticism:
A Cognitive View, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 736 (1977). See also David L. Bazelon, Psychia-
trists and the Adversary Process, 230 Sci. AM. 18 (1974).
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examined a subject's capabilities of distinguishing patients with and without
brain injury based on results from a popular instrument used to detect or-
ganicity.10 2 Secretaries fared better than psychologists, and the performance
level of all subjects barely exceeded chance levels. 10 3 In another study, a
variety of judges studied the case history of a real patient. When answering
25 multiple choice questions concerning responses that would be indicative
of the patients' personality, the judges' accuracy did not increase signifi-
cantly with increasing information, and they were overconfident in their
judgment. Experienced clinical psychologists did no better than graduate or
undergraduate students, and, on the whole, judges did little better than
chance. 104 These results are typical. Almost no evidence exists showing
that experts are better qualified to diagnose a situation than "regulars" or
relative beginners. 105 Hence, "there is little empirical evidence that justifies
the granting of 'expert' status to the clinician on the basis of his training,
experience, or information-processing ability. ''1 6
B. CLINICAL DECISIONMAKING IN THE COURTROOM
Most relevant to the topic of this Article, of course, is research on deci-
sionmaking by mental health professionals in forensic contexts. This re-
search is newer and not nearly as extensive as that related to decisionmaking
generally or in nonforensic clinical settings. There is emerging, however,
cumulative evidence that forensic decisionmaking is just as flawed as typical
clinical judgment.10 7 The existing research examines such typical areas as
the evaluation of insanity, the competency to stand trial, the prediction of
102. See Lewis R. Goldberg, The Effectiveness of Clinicians' Judgments: The Diagnosis of
Organic Brain Damage from the Bender-Gestalt Test, 23 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 25 (1959).
"[D]iagnostic accuracy ... does not depend on experience or training in psychology." Id at
32. For a more up-to-date compilation of research challenging the accuracy of psychologists
to make useful assessments of brain injury, see DAVID FAUST & JAY ZISKIN, 1-2 BRAIN DAM-
AGE CLAIMS: COPING WITH NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE (1991).
103. Goldberg, supra note 102, at 32.
104. Stuart Oskamp, Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgments, 29 J. CONSULTING
PSYCHOL. 261 (1965).
105. Faust, supra note 31, at 420. "It is clear that experience does not necessarily improve
judgment." Payne et al., supra note 31, at 106. "[T]he results on validity generally fail to
support the value of experience in mental health fields." Howard N. Garb, Clinical Judgment,
Clinical Training and Professional Experience, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 387, 391 (1989).
106. JERRY S. WIGGINS, PERSONALITY AND PREDICTION: PRINCIPLES OF PERSONALITY
ASSESSMENT 131 (1973). This statement "seems to hold equally today." Faust, supra note 31,
at 420.
107. David Faust & Jay Ziskin, The Expert Witness in Psychology and Psychiatry, 241 SCI-
ENCE 31, 32 (1988) [hereinafter Faust & Ziskin]. "[Situdies examining the accuracy of judg-
ments directly pertinent to forensic assessment, such as the ability to detect the simulation of
disorder (that is, malingering) or to predict violence, have shown particularly high rates of
error among clinicians." Id. For an earlier debate on the admissibility of testimony by mental
health professionals, compare Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An
Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527 (1978) to Richard J. Bonnie & Chris-
topher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case
for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427 (1980). Bonnie and Slobogin favor such testi-




violence, and malingering (feigning illness). 0 8
With regard to insanity, one series of surveys investigated whether the
ideological attitudes of psychiatrists and psychologists toward the insanity
defense affected their response to two particular cases, one hypothetical in
which a defendant has killed two fellow employees and then makes an un-
successful suicide attempt, and one real (John Hinckley).109 In Survey 1,
comprising mental health professionals in Michigan, psychiatrists had signif-
icantly more sympathetic attitudes toward the insanity defense than psychol-
ogists. 10  Survey 2 determined that the Michigan mental health
professionals' "judgments of insanity in a particular [hypothetical] case were
directly related to their opinion of the insanity defense itself.""' Survey 3
studied a national sample of 115 psychiatrists and 147 psychologists ran-
domly given one of three versions of the hypothetical case-a neutral ver-
sion, a version sympathetic toward use of the insanity defense, and a version
unsympathetic toward its use. As before, psychiatrists were more favorable
toward the insanity defense. Professionals who testified more frequently for
the defense thought the hypothetical defendant was genuinely insane, while
those who testified more frequently for the prosecution were less likely to
view the defendant as insane."12 Again, the central finding was that those
with more favorable attitudes toward the insanity defense were significantly
more likely to view the defendant as insane. 1 3 The authors concluded that
34% of the variance in professional opinion about insanity could "be ac-
counted for by variables that are relevant to the expert rather than the (hy-
108. The outcome of forensic decisionmaking may be more damaging than routine clinical
decisionmaking. "People are being very seriously affected by psychological and psychiatric
testimony. Consequences involve loss of children, jail, and sometimes even death." Robyn M.
Dawes, Experience and Validity of Clinical Judgment: The Illusory Correlation, 7 BEHAV. SCI.
& L. 457, 466 (1989).
The results of forensic mental health examinations can have profound effects on
the destinies of persons charged with or convicted of crimes. Such examinations
involve determinations of competency to stand trial, judgments about mental
illness, insanity, responsibility for crime, predictions for future dangerousness,
recommendations for disposition after criminal conviction, and other psychole-
gal issues.
Ingo Keilitz, A Model Process for Forensic Mental Health Screening and Evaluation, 8 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 355, 355 (1984). See also Wyda & Black, supra note 71.
109. Robert J. Homant & Daniel B. Kennedy, Subjective Factors in Clinicians'Judgments
of Insanity: Comparison of a Hypothetical Case and an Actual Case, 18 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RE-
SEARCH AND PRACTICE 439 (1987)[hereinafter Homant & Kennedy].
110. Id. at 440. "Fifty-eight percent of the psychiatrists, in comparison with 26% of the
psychologists, rated themselves above the midpoint of the scale." Id. This difference would
occur less than I in a 1000 by chance.
11. Id. at 441. In addition, psychiatrists again were found more likely than psychologists
to favor the insanity defense, although only to a statistically nonsignificant extent.
112. Another study of "appointment bias" using clinical psychology graduate students also
found that those who believed they were appointed for the defense were more likely to view a
hypothetical defendant as insane than those who believed they were appointed by the prosecu-
tion. See Randy Otto, Bias and Expert Testimony of Mental Health Professionals, 7 BEH. SCI.
& L. 267 (1989). A brief description of the study in its original form as the author's doctoral
dissertation is reported in Beckham et al., supra note 31, at 80.
113. Homant & Kennedy, supra note 109, at 442. The correlation between attitude and a
determination of whether the hypothetical defendant was insane was so high that it would
occur less than I time in 1000 by chance. Id.
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pothetical) defendant." ' 1 4 Finally, in Survey 4, 46 of the professionals who
responded to Survey 3 were asked to make similar determinations from a
brief description of the Hinckley case. Consistent with prior findings, ideo-
logical attitude toward the insanity defense was a significant predictor of
whether experts judged Hinckley as insane or guilty." 15 In all, this study
lends support to the idea that there is "a large element of subjectivity in
judgments of insanity."116
One study of 110 highly experienced forensic psychiatrists and psycholo-
gists sought to further investigate appointment bias and uncover factors that
mental health professionals use to determine whether a defendant is in-
sane.'17 The subjects were presented with a hypothetical and ambiguous
(neutral) case that included information about a female defendant's personal,
social, and employment history, family relationships, arrest behavior, and
current mental state, as well as the results on a wide variety of instruments,
including an intelligence scale, a paper-and-pencil personality test, a projec-
tive personality technique (Rorschach inkblots), and achievement tests.
They were then instructed to determine whether the defendant met the in-
sanity test in Florida. 1 8 Although the researchers found no appointment
bias, there was no consensus among subjects as to whether the defendant was
insane at the time of the crime. Overall, 30.3% of the subjects found her
guilty and 64.2% found her not guilty by reason of insanity.' 19 Those who
found her guilty based their opinion on different information than those who
found her insane, the former considering statements by others and jail obser-
vations as more important than the interview and certain test scores
(predominantly on cognitive measures). Psychiatrists tended to perceive the
defendant as less mentally ill than did psychologists and were more likely to
depend on such relatively unreliable data as the defendant's version of the
alleged offense and the interview with the defendant than did the psycholo-
gists who tended to rely more on external sources. 120
114. Id. at 443.
115. Id. at 444.
116. Id. at 445.
117. Beckham et al., supra note 31, at 79.
118. Florida uses the M'Naghten test. See M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep.
718 (H.L. 1843).
119. Beckham et al., supra note 31, at 83. The remaining 5.5% offered no opinion. Of
course, the absence of consensus can be partially explained by the fact that the authors deliber-
ately chose an ambiguous case. But as the following text and note 120 explain, the study's
relevance in this Article is to demonstrate how the cognitive biases of psychologists and psy-
chiatrists contribute to a lack of consensus.
120. Id. at 83-87. The authors view this study as showing that experienced forensic exam-
iners are not biased in the same way as those surveyed in the Homant & Kennedy and Otto
studies and that their findings "support the continued utility and fairness of pretrial assess-
ments." Id. at 87. However, the results are more troubling than the authors believe. For
example, despite purposeful ambiguity, "[n]o responding examiner.., returned the question-
naire stating that there was not enough information to make a judgment," id. at 86, illustrating
the phenomenon that, in the face of ambiguity, clinicians are more likely to make decisions
than to defer them. In addition, as the authors themselves admit, "differences between exam-
iners [were related to] variation in how defendants are rated and data are integrated," id.,
reinforcing the criticism that much clinical decisionmaking is idiosyncratic. Finally, very ex-
perienced clinicians interpreting precisely the same data came to highly divergent conclusions
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Although there have been a number of attempts to design instruments to
evaluate competency to stand trial, 12 1 there is very little, if any, evaluation of
their validity. 122 Existing research within the framework of decision theory
or information processing is scanty at best. "Several studies have found that
interrater agreement on competency to stand trial is quite high, usually over
90%. ''123 These results, however, do not indicate that mental health profes-
sionals are more accurate than lay people. In fact, lay evaluators with mini-
mal training using a structured interview have been found to produce
decisions that agree with forensic clinicians in 90% of cases. 124 However,
with regard to the defendant's mental state at the time of the crime. As for the usefulness of
experience itself, "[v]irtually every available study shows that amount of clinical training and
experience are unrelated to judgmental accuracy." Faust & Ziskin, supra note 107, at 32. For
supporting reviews, see Robyn M. Dawes, Experience and the Validity of Clinical Judgments:
The Illusory Correlation, 7 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 457 (1989); Howard N. Garb, Clinical Judgment,
Clinical Training, and Professional Experience, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 387 (1989); Lewis R.
Goldberg, Simple Models or Simple Processes? Some Research on Clinical Judgments, 23 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 483 (1968).
121. See, e.g., Thomas Grisso & Sandra K. Seigel, Assessment of Competency to Stand
Trial, in FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 145 (William J. Curran et al. eds., 1986); Paul
D. Lipsitt et al., Competency for Trial: A Screening Instrument, 128 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 105
(1971); Stephen L. Golding et al., Assessment and Conceptualization of Competency to Stand
Trial: Preliminary Data on the Interdisciplinary Fitness Interview, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 321
(1984) [hereinafter Golding et al.]. See generally THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETEN-
CIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS 62 (1986); RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN
L. GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL (1980) [hereinafter ROESCH & GOLDING].
These instruments either have a high false-positive rate or simply show promise of real world
usefulness but are better classified as "research instrument[s]." Golding et al., supra this note,
at 332; see Edgar J. Nottingham & Robert E. Mattson, A Validation Study of the Competency
Screening Test, 5 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 329, 334 (1981). For an example of a promising set of
research instruments designed to measure the competency of mental patients to consent to be
medicated, see Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, Mentally Ill and Non-Mentally-Ill Pa-
tients' Abilities to Understand Informed Consent Disclosures for Medication, 15 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 377 (1991). The authors acknowledge that their scale, Measuring Understanding of
Disclosure, "is intended currently as a research instrument, and its utility and validity for
clinical use is not known." Id. at 379 n.3.
Of course, competency is a concept that is not limited to a determination of whether a
defendant can stand trial. Mental health professionals are also asked to make decisions con-
cerning whether a defendant is competent to confess, to waive counsel, to be executed, to
testify, to waive a jury trial, and to resist imposition of the insanity defense. In the civil con-
text, questions may arise, e.g., as to whether a party is competent to make a will, to contract,
or to consent to treatment. See Are Courts Competent?, supra note 22, at 967.
122. Golding et al., supra note 121, at 332. "The ultimate validity study would be difficult
to implement.... Such a study would involve allowing defendants judged to be incompetent
to have a trial anyway, despite their possible incompetency. These defendants could be as-
sessed and observed during the judicial proceedings to determine if in fact they were unable to
participate properly in their defense." Id. Such research would probably be unethical. See
American Psychological Association, Ethical Principles of Psychologists, 45 AM. PSYCHOLO-
GIST 390, 394-95 (1990), and would almost assuredly be unconstitutional. See Riggins v. Ne-
vada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383
U.S. 375 (1966).
123. RALPH REISNER & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYS-
TEM 442-43 (2d ed. 1990). For representative studies, see ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note
121, at 188-91; Norman G. Poythress & Harley V. Stock, Competency to Stand Trial: A His-
torical Review and Some New Data, 8 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131 (1980).
124. ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 121, at 188-91. See Margaret Windsor Jackson,
Psychiatric Decision-Making for the Courts: Judges, Psychiatrists, Lay People?, 9 INT'L J. L. &
PSYCHIATRY 507 (1986). "Judges and psychiatrists appeared to make decisions in a similar
manner to laypeople; while they assigned more weight to psychiatric information, it was not
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"because unfitness is a relatively rare event, occurring in less than ... 2% of
all criminal defendants,"'' 25 these high rates of agreement may be the result
not of any particular acumen by both professional and lay decisionmakers
but because of the high base rate for competency of those evaluated. Thus, a
second rater could simply agree with a first rater all of the time without even
looking at assessment data and produce a very high rate of concordance.' 26
Furthermore, ward observations, psychological tests, and other data gath-
ered while hospitalized have little effect on the determination of incompe-
tency. 127 One study found that the number of previous hospitalizations
"was the most powerful determinant of psychiatric decisions involving fit-
ness."1 28 Other important factors include the patient's educational level and
history of violent offenses. 129
In contrast to the relative dearth of studies assessing the accuracy of com-
petency to stand trial decisions, there has been a plethora of research on
predictions of violence' 30 that supports the conclusion that professional pre-
dictions of violence are more likely to be wrong than correct. 131 Pre-Bare-
foot v. Estelle studies bear out the*Court's conclusions. For example, in one
study, previously institutionalized patients, some of whom were predicted to
be dangerous and some of whom were predicted to be non-dangerous, were
followed for three years. 132 During this period, 41% of those predicted to be
dangerous were rearrested for violent crimes, but 31% of those predicted not
to be dangerous were also rearrested for violent crimes. 3 3 Even more dis-
couraging, in a second study, psychiatrists assessed the dangerousness of fel-
ony defendants found not competent to stand trial.134 After a three year
period, no differences in assaultive behavior were found between subjects
predicted to be dangerous and those predicted to be non-dangerous. 35 All
of the clinical studies yielded "high false-positive rates, ranging from 65% to
86%. Other clinical studies not cited have shown even higher false-positive
rates."1 3
6
clear that the professionals primarily used their specialized knowledge. Therefore it can not be
said that they either made decisions different from the layperson or that specialized knowledge
•.. was responsible for the decision outcome." Id. at 516-17.
125. Golding et al., supra note 121, at 131.
126. See supra note 67.
127. ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 121, at 190.
128. Robert J. Menzies et al., The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Psychiatric Deci-
sion-Making, 27 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 463, 465 (1982) [hereinafter Menzies et al.].
129. Id. at 465-66. Those more highly educated were found less fit than those less edu-
cated, and those with a history of violent criminal conduct were more likely to be found fit. Id.
130. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 900 n.9, 920-22 (1983) (summarizing research
existing as of 1983).
131. Id. at 921 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
132. Henry J. Steadman, A New Look at Recidivism Among Patuxent Inmates, 5 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 200, 209 (1977).
133. Id.
134. Joseph J. Cocozza & Henry J. Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of
Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 (1976).
135. Id. at 1097.
136. Deidre Klassen & William A. O'Connor, A Prospective Study of Predictors of Violence
in Adult Male Mental Health Admissions, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 143, 144 (1988) [hereinafter
Klassen & O'Connor]. At least one study found a false positive rate as high as 92%. Ernst A.
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Later research using more sophisticated predictive models has been more
promising. In one study, a two-year follow-up of forensic cases yielded a
false-positive rate of only 44%. 137 Another study reported a 41% false-posi-
tive rate. 138 These results may exhibit more accuracy relative to older stud-
ies, but they do not inspire much confidence that mental health professionals
can predict violent behavior very precisely. 139
One study illustrates how the representative heuristic operates in clinical
predictions of dangerousness. 14 In assessing forensic patients, psychiatrists
were most likely to conclude that the patient was dangerous if he had a
history of violence, had been previously incarcerated, and faced a charge of
violence at the time of assessment. 141 These data, however, are redundant
and interdependent, creating a stereotypic picture of a potentially dangerous
individual.
142
Wenk & Robert L. Emrich, Assaultive Youth: An Exploratory Study of the Assaultive Experi-
ence and Assaultive Potential of California Youth Authority Wards, 9 J. RES. CRIME & DE-
LINQ. 171 (1972). See generally JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT
BEHAVIOR (1981). Some of these early studies have been criticized on methodological
grounds. See, e.g., Klassen & O'Connor, supra at 153-54; George E. Dix, Clinical Evaluation
of the "Dangerousness" of "Normal" Criminal Defendants, 66 VA. L. REV. 523, 529-35 (1980);
Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, Is It Unethical to Offer Predictions of Future Violence?,
16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. (forthcoming 1992) [hereinafter Grisso & Appelbaum]; Thomas R.
Litwack & Louis B. Schlesinger, Assessing and Predicting Violence: Research, Law, and Appli-
cations, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 205 (Irving B. Weiner & Allen K. Hess
eds., 1987).
137. Diana Sepejak et al., Clinical Predictions of Dangerousness: Two-Year Follow-up of
408 Pre-Trial Cases, 11 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 171 (1983).
138. Klassen & O'Connor, supra note 136. However, this study used actuarial variables
such as arrest records, age of patient, demographic data, and situational factors, not clinical
judgment. Thus, as the authors acknowledge, "[tihe present results may be partly attributable
to the study design, which used actuarial measures, short-term treatment, a short-term follow-
up period, and similar contexts of prediction as recommended by Monahan." Id, at 153. See
generally John Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a Second Generation of
Theory and Policy, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 10 (1984). For a brief discussion of actuarial
versus clinical prediction, see infra notes 164-167 and accompanying text.
139. This statement should not be taken to mean that predictions of violence or any other
expert testimony should be admitted in legal proceedings unless it can be presented with abso-
lute confidence. As the Supreme Court in Barefoot already acknowledged, significantly less
than perfect evidence on future violence is admissible and may comport with the applicable
rules of evidence. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 901. See also Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780
(1992) (psychiatric opinion "reliable enough to permit the courts to base civil commitments on
clear and convincing medical evidence that a person is mentally ill and dangerous"); Schall v.
Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984) ("[F]rom a legal point of view, there is nothing inherently
unreliable about a prediction of future criminal conduct."). But see id. at 293-94 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that evidence is "overwhelming" that there are no diagnostic tools "to
predict reliably which juveniles will engage in violent crime").
140. Menzies et al., supra note 128.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 465.
Therefore, a young, single male accused, currently unemployed, with a past his-
tory of offenses, presents a uniform picture for evaluators: a loser. As a result,
the offense is more easily thought to be representative of that characterization.
The fallacy is that many of these factors are not mutually independent, and a
false sense of consistency is created, consistent with a stereotypic vision of foren-
sic patients.
Id. at 469.
This and other studies of forensic decisionmaking also support findings from studies of
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In one of the few other studies using decision theory to evaluate clinical
predictions of violence, fifteen psychologists and fifteen psychiatrists with
significant clinical experience were asked to evaluate case materials of forty
male psychiatric inpatients. 143 These subjects were asked to make a predic-
tion that the patient would act violently within just seven days of admission
based on eighteen variables derived from a psychiatric rating scale and
whether a violent act had been a factor in admission. 144 "[O]n the whole,
the judges were successful in identifying approximately two out of every five
patients who would become violent."' 145 On the other hand, "on the average
about one in four patients who did not become assaultive during the study
period were labeled as violent." 146 Consistent with the decisionmaking liter-
ature, "judges tended to give inordinate weight to cues that were in fact
unrelated to imminent violence ... and to give lesser weight to cues that
were more strongly related to the criterion." 147 The study concluded that
little empirical justification supports using psychologists and psychiatrists to
assess patients' dangerousness:
Composite predictions were not significantly related to patients' actual
violence, and few individual judges' accuracy levels were statistically
significant.... This finding of low accuracy was obtained despite our
effort to limit prediction to a highly circumscribed time frame and to a
setting with which participating clinical judges had considerable famili-
arity. . . . [T]he present results demonstrate little more accuracy in
clinicians' forecasts of imminent violence than has been found in analy-
ses on predictions of long-term dangerousness.
148
clinical decisionmaking generally. David Faust, Data Integration in Legal Evaluations: Can
Clinicians Deliver on Their Promises, 7 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 469, 473 (1989). "Although clini-
cians often believe they have considered and combined numerous variables in reaching conclu-
sions, objective indicators consistently show that their decisions can be accounted for, in large
part, by reliance on just a few factors or pieces of information." Id.
143. Paul D. Werner et al., Reliability, Accuracy, and Decision-Making Strategy in Clinical
Predictions of Imminent Dangerousness, 51 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 815 (1983).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 819. The average "hit rate" (true positive) was .39 for all judges, with a range of
.17 to .67. Id.
146. Id. The average "false alarm" rate (false positive) was .27, with a range of .07 to .43.
Id.
147. Id. at 820. As with other studies, the researchers found "little association between
experience and accuracy of judgment." Id. at 822.
148. Id. A review of research performed in the 1980s concluded that "[t]he most striking
characteristics of recent risk assessment research.., is that the research is so inconsistent. For
every study that reports increases in predictive accuracy, there is another that finds clinical
risk assessments no better than chance." John Monahan, Risk Assessment of Violence Among
the Mentally Disordered: Generating Useful Knowledge, 11 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 249, 251
(1988). See also Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97
(1984).
Apparently, there has been some rethinking about the issue in the 1990's. Some very recent
articles support the use of expert testimony by mental health professionals in criminal and civil
cases under carefully prescribed conditions and argue that offering predictions about future
violent behavior can comport with social science research, rules of evidence, and the ethical
values of organizational psychology and psychiatry. See, e.g., Grisso & Appelbaum, supra
note 136; John Monahan, Limiting Therapist Exposure to Tarasoff Liability: Guidelines for
Risk Containment, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST (forthcoming) ("[G]iven my view that violence was
virtually impossible to assess, I was retained solely by defense attorneys. Later, as I came to
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Finally, evaluation of malingering permeates all of forensic decisionmak-
ing. "Questions involving malingering and deception include such issues as
the mental state of the defendant, or the defendant's competency to partici-
pate in the civil or criminal justice system [and] may have serious implica-
tions for the judicial disposition of the defendant." 149
Most of the studies in this area have looked at the psychometric accuracy
of the evaluation instrument, not the accuracy of the decision by the clini-
cian. For example, the consensus with regard to unstructured clinical inter-
views, the technique most widely used for assessment, particularly by
psychiatrists, is that they are "often haphazard in their evaluation of malin-
gering and defensiveness with an over-reliance on invalidated or poorly vali-
dated devices."' 150 Psychologists' use of their traditional storehouse of
psychometric measures has not yielded significantly better judgments of ma-
lingering. For example, reliance on IQ scores or patterns of responses from
subtests gleaned from intelligence tests has met with only very cautious opti-
mism.151 With regard to paper-and-pencil personality tests such as the Min-
nesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), which has a scale
designed to detect those who are "faking bad" and "faking good," reviewers
have concluded that "even the MMPI has serious limitations to identify ma-
lingering and deception accurately."' 152 Projective techniques, like the Ror-
believe that risk assessment might be feasible and appropriate under some circumstances, refer-
rals began to come equally from defense and plaintiff's attorneys.").
It may be entirely proper and ethical for mental health professionals to offer evidence about
future violence. "The expert who provides reliable risk probability information (and clearly
explains its limitations) to courts within [the applicable statute] engages in ethical practice...
even if the legal outcome deprives the individual of liberty 'mistakenly.'" Grisso & Appel-
baum, supra note 136, at 17. See also John Monahan & David B. Wexler, A Definite Maybe:
Proof and Probability in Civil Commitment, 2 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 40-41 (1978) (explaining
that in jurisdictions requiring commitment when it is established beyond a reasonable doubt
that it is more likely than not that a person in the near future will inflict serious bodily harm to
another, mental health professionals may be able to testify that the person should be commit-
ted because the potential for future violence is a "definite maybe"). I do not necessarily disa-
gree with these views. What I do argue for is that evidence about probable future violence be
subjected to examination in proceedings that are formal and adversarial, and heard by judicial
decisionmakers who are genuinely independent of the parties.
149. James R.P. Ogloff, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony Regarding Malingering and
Deception, 8 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 27, 28 (1990) (parenthetical notes omitted). "To the extent that
every clinical assessment involves some check for malingering, all mental health professionals
should have some level of expertise in detecting deception among clients." Id. at 32.
150. Richard Rogers, Structured Interviews and Dissimulations, in CLINICAL ASSESSMENT
OF MALINGERING AND DECEPTION 250 (Richard Rogers ed., 1988). "[G]iven the vast litera-
ture regarding the frequency with which errors occur in human judgments .... it may be safe
to say that unstructured clinical interviews are not very efficacious in identifying malingering
in defendants." Ogloff, supra note 149, at 32-33.
151. Ogloff, supra note 149, at 34. "[W]hile intelligence tests may eventually prove useful
and accurate in identifying malingering and deception, it appears that extreme caution must be
used when a clinician attempts to rely exclusively upon an intelligence test to identify mal-
ingers." Id. Compare David J. Schretlen, The Use of Psychological Tests to Identify Malin-
gered Symptoms of Mental Disorder, 8 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 451 (1988) (promising use of
pattern analysis) with Robert K. Heaton et al., Prospects for Faking Believable Deficits on
Neuropsychological Testing, 46 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 892 (1978) (no signifi-
cant differences in total IQ between those with genuine disorders and those asked to malinger).
152. Ogloff, supra note 149, at 35. See Roger L. Greene, Assessment of Malingering and
Defensiveness by Objective Personality Inventories, in CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF MALINGER-
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schach Inkblot Test, have also yielded poor results. In one of the few studies
examining whether clinicians can detect simulated results, experienced clini-
cians often confused Rorschach protocols of psychotic patients with normal
individuals feigning psychosis. 53
Because of the increasing involvement of clinical neuropsychologists in
the forensic arena, to help assess the presence of brain injury in personal
injury cases or to support an insanity defense for example, 154 some studies
are emerging regarding their ability to detect malingering. Early research on
the ability of these psychologists to detect malingering on intellectual and
neuropsychological tests produced highly accurate results, 155 but these stud-
ies have been criticized on methodological grounds. For example, the deci-
sionmakers were given the base rates for malingering; many of the cases
involved judgments in patients with moderate or severe organic damage un-
like actual disputed forensic cases where the injury is more subtle; and in one
study the researcher had prior access to the actual cases on which he was
tested. 156
Other, better designed, studies have not shown commensurate accuracy.
For example, in a study closer to an actual clinical situation, ten neuro-
psychologists performed from chance levels to about 20% above chance
levels in distinguishing results from a comprehensive neuropsychological test
battery for actual and malingering head injuries.157 In a second study, three
adolescents were given an individually-administered intelligence test and a
comprehensive neuropsychological test battery and told to do less well than
they ordinarily would ("fake bad"). Their test protocols and that of an ac-
tual brain-injured adolescent were reviewed by 114 practicing neuro-
psychologists. Across the three cases, 78% of the decisionmakers judged the
faked protocols as abnormal, with 96% of those judging the protocols to be
that from brain-injured patients. 158 Then, an additional group of 125
neuropsychologists were sent two malingering and two actual head-injury
cases and informed that 50% of the cases came from malingerers. Although
ING AND DECEPTION 123 (Richard Rogers ed., 1988); Roger L. Greene, The Relative Efficacy
of F-K and the Obvious and Subtle Scales to Detect Overreporting of Psychopathology on the
MMPI, 44 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 152 (1988).
153. See Samuel Albert et al., Faking Psychosis on the Rorschach: Can Expert Judges De-
tect Malingering?, 44 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 115 (1980). "It seems clear that unstruc-
tured interviews and projective tests are the least effective techniques to identify malingerers."
Ogloff, supra note 149, at 35.
154. See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Barth et al., Forensic Aspects of Mild Head Trauma, 1 J. HEAD
TRAUMA REHABILITATION 63, 64 (1986). The neuropsychologist is "rapidly becoming an
integral part of the physician-lawyer team." Id.
155. E.g., Rahn A. Bruhn & Max R. Reed, Simulation of Brain Damage on the Bender-
Gestalt Test by College Students, 39 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 244 (1975) (about 90% hit
rate); Ronald A. Goebel, Detection of Faking on the Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Test
Battery, 39 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 731 (1983) (94% to 97% hit rates).
156. Goebel, supra note 155.
157. This study has also been questioned on methodological grounds. See id. at 733; David
Faust et al., Pediatric Malingering: The Capacity of Children to Fake Believable Deficits on
Neuropsychological Testing, 56 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 578, 578 (1988) [here-
inafter Pediatric Malingering].
158. David Faust et al., Neuropsychologist' Capacity to Detect Adolescent Malingerers, 19
PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. AND PRAC. 508, 510-11 (1988) [hereinafter Adolescent Malingerers].
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91% of the respondents correctly identified the actual cases (of which 90%
attributed the results to brain damage), 57% of the respondents also judged
the malingering cases to be cases of actual brain damage, a nonsignificant
improvement over chance, i.e., the 50% base rate. 159
A subsequent study examined the same phenomenon with three pre-ado-
lescent children ages 9-12 who were told to perform poorly on the same
scales used in the adolescent study.16o Of the forty-two experienced clinical
neuropsychologists responding, 93% judged the faked protocols as abnor-
mal, with 87% attributing the abnormality to brain damage and the remain-
der to functional problems. None of the respondents concluded that the test
protocols came from malingering subjects. 16 1 These results "suggest that the
detection of malingering is far more difficult than practitioners may believe
and raise particular concern about courtroom assessments in which simula-
tion of deficit is often a possibility."' 16 2
This review of the literature of human, clinical, and forensic decisionmak-
ing does not (and should not) evoke much confidence. Errors in judgment
are common to both lay people and professional clinicians, including those
involved in the assessment, diagnosis, and treatment of the mentally dis-
abled. Many of the studies reviewed here show that mental health profes-
sionals are no more accurate than lay decisionmakers and that both
professionals and lay people rely on the same judgment strategies and make
the same errors. Many other studies show that a select group of experienced
professionals or those specializing in a particular area of mental health make
decisions no better than less experienced or general practitioners. Most rele-
vant, erroneous decisionmaking is a common problem in courts and in foren-
sic clinics where mental health professionals work.
Despite attempts to educate clinicians about heuristics, behavior decision
theory, information processing, 163 and the availability of actuarial or
159. Id. at 512-13. These results are particularly discouraging because the adolescent ma-
lingerers were given only very minimal instruction about how to produce credible protocols.
Plaintiffs who plan to portray themselves as suffering from organic injury are likely to produce
more credibly faked test results by studying test manuals and relevant textbooks. In other
cases, plaintiffs may have actually suffered head trauma but seek to feign or exaggerate their
deficits. Id. at 513.
160. Pediatric Malingering, supra note 157.
161. Id. at 579-80.
162. Adolescent Malingerers, supra note 158, at 514. See generally FAUST & ZISKIN, supra
note 102.
Only some recently developed and validated structured interview formats have shown signs
of accurately distinguishing those simulating mental illness from actual patients. See, e.g.,
CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERING AND DECEPTION (Richard Rogers ed., 1988);
Richard Rogers & James L. Cavanaugh, Jr., Application of the SADS [Schedule of Affective
Disorders and Schizophrenia] Diagnostic Interview to Forensic Psychiatry, 9 J. PSYCHIATRY &
L. 329 (1981); Richard Rogers et al., The SIRS [Structured Interview of Reporting Symptoms]
as a Measure of Malingering: A Validation Study with Correctional Sample, 8 BEHAV. SCI. &
L. 85 (1990). "The SADS and the SIRS are two alternatives to traditional clinical interviewing
which provide much promise for identifying malingerers. Future research on these techniques
would be helpful in further demonstrating their efficacy .... Ogloff, supra note 149, at 34.
163. See, e.g., Impediments, supra note 59, at 326-29 (consider alternatives, think Bayesian,
decrease reliance on memory); Faust, supra note 31, at 427-28 (search for disconfirming signs,
consider alternatives, recognize predictive uncertainty, act cautiously rather than with confi-
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mechanical methods that have been shown for decades to produce markedly
more accurate and less biased clinical decisions, 164 the vast majority of clini-
cians persist, either in ignorance or with misplaced confidence, in using in-
struments of questionable validity and ignore relevant factors that contribute
to more accurate decisionmaking. 165 Even those who are the strongest pro-
ponents of actuarial methods concede that although they surpass traditional
clinical methods, "actuarial procedures are far from infallible, sometimes
achieving only modest results,"' 166 and do not yet directly concern the foren-
dence); Robyn M. Dawes, Representative Thinking in Clinical Judgment, 6 CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. REV. 425, 440 (1986) (keep track of judgment outcomes, write down rules of proba-
bilistic inference). See generally HUMAN INFERENCE, supra note 28 (concerning cognition and
inference); HOGARTH, supra note 34 (concerning decision-making, judgment, and choice);
Christine M. Nezu et al., The Multiple Applications of Problem-Solving Principles in Clinical
Practice, in COGNITIVE THERAPY IN ACTION: EVOLVING INNOVATIVE PRACTICE (K.
Kuehlwein and H. Rosen eds., forthcoming); Elstein, supra note 29, at 42-43; Jordan, supra
note 64, at 100-01; Lynn H. Arnoult & Craig A. Anderson, Identifying and Reducing Causal
Reasoning Biases in Clinical Practice, in TURK & SALOVEY, supra note 29, at 209, 222-28.
164. Dawes et al., supra note 76, at 1668. In contrast to the clinical method, where deci-
sion-makers process information in their heads, "[i]n the actuarial or statistical method the
human judge is eliminated and conclusions rest solely on empirically established relations be-
tween data and the condition or event of interest." Id. "The clinical-statistical controversy in
psychology is but one specific manifestation of the apparent conflict between two broad ap-
proaches to prediction: quantitative versus qualitative, mathematical versus nonmathematical,
scientific versus intuitive, the formula versus the head, or computer versus man." Bayesian
Synthesis, supra note 65, at 767. See also Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball:
Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408
(1979). The systematic comparison of these two methods of decision-making was stimulated
by the seminal work, PAUL E. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION (1954),
written almost 40 years ago. Meehl argued "that diagnoses and predictions made by psycholo-
gists tend to be less accurate than predictions in which the same information available to the
psychologist is integrated by regression formula-that is, by a weighted average of predictors."
Clark McCauley, Selection of National Science Foundation Graduate Fellows: A Case Study of
Psychologists Failing to Apply What They Know About Decision Making, 46 AM. PSYCHOLO-
GIST 1287, 1289 (1991). Even unweighted, "linear" models of statistical prediction are more
accurate than clinicians in detecting mental illness. See Robyn M. Dawes & Bernard Corri-
gan, Linear Models in Decision Making, 81 PSYCHOL. BULL. 95 (1974). Further, even when
the clinician's own decisionmaking strategies are represented mathematically (known as "boot-
strapping"), see Lewis R. Goldberg, Man versus Models of Man: A Rationale, Plus Some Evi-
dence for a Method of Improving Clinical Inference, 73 PSYCHOL. BULL. 422 (1970)), the
mathematical model is more accurate because it eliminates inconsistency, idiosyncracy, and
the tendency to respond to respond to selective cues. See E.H. Bowman, Consistency and
Optimality in Managerial Decision Making, 9 MGMT. Sci. 310 (1963). In the most recent
comprehensive review examining 100 studies comparing clinical and statistical prediction, the
authors conclude that "[i]n virtually every one of these studies, the actuarial method has
equaled or surpassed the clinical method, sometimes slightly and sometimes substantially."
Dawes et al., supra note 76, at 1669. For an earlier, respected review, see Jack Sawyer, Mea-
surement and Prediction: Clinical and Statistical, 66 PSYCHOL. BULL. 178 (1966) (examining
45 studies). The superiority of actuarial methods has been shown even in "studies that in-
volved highly experienced clinicians, who were allowed access to preferred sources of informa-
tion and who rendered judgments common to their everyday practices." David Faust, Data
Integration in Legal Evaluations: Can Clinicians Deliver on their Promises, 7 BEHAV. Sci. & L.
469, 476 (1989). Despite all of the above, the "[r]esearch on clinical versus statistical judgment
has had little impact on everyday decision making, particularly within its field of origin,
clinical psychology." Dawes et al., supra note 76, at 1672.
165. For a somewhat sarcastic analysis of why clinicians continue to act in ways that lessen
rather than improve the accuracy of decisionmaking, see Paul E. Meehl, Causes and Effects of
My Disturbing Little Book, 50 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 370, 374-75 (1986).




In light of all this, it is not too polemical to conclude that professional
judgment is, in fact, not much better than arbitrary judgment. It is not com-
mensurate with arbitrary judgment only to the extent that clinical deci-
sionmakers attempt to account for all relevant variables gleaned from their
assessment and to act in thoughtful good faith. But, in fact, professional
judgment is simply judgment made by a professional, not a judgment that
has any special aura of reliability or validity and is often no better than lay
judgment. If, from the Supreme Court's perspective, the only questions are
whether "professional judgment in fact was exercised," 168 or whether the
clinician "substantial[ly] depart[ed] from accepted professional judgment,
practice, or standards,"1 69 then mentally disabled persons will be vulnerable
to erroneous decisions and unlikely to prevail if they seek to challenge those
decisions.
It is risky enough to permit judges or jurors to rely on the interpretations,
analyses, and conclusions of mental health experts in adversary proceedings.
But to make mental health professionals the primary decisionmaker, subject
only to very limited judicial review, in determinations of whether persons
should be civilly committed or should be compelled to take possibly risky
psychotropic medication, compounds the risk. The preference for "infor-
mal, traditional medical investigative techniques"1 70 and reliance on an "ad-
ministrative review using medical decisionmakers"' 7'1 will bar access to the
adversary process, and hence bar the opportunity to challenge judgments of
mental health professionals through competent cross-examination, the use of
competing experts, and other devices that serve as correctives to often confi-
dent but mistaken judgments by psychiatrists and psychologists. 1 72 When,
bounds in our current capacities to predict human behavior. An awareness of the modest
results that are often achieved by even the best available methods can help to counter unrealis-
tic faith in our predictive powers and our understanding of human behavior." Id. "Several
studies suggest that the best role for people in judgement should be that of a 'measuring instru-
ment' for data that are to be combined subsequently by mechanical means." HOGARTH, supra
note 34, at 57.
167. Faust & Ziskin, supra note 107, at 34.
168. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982) (quoting the lower court's opinion,
Youngberg v. Romeo, 644 F.2d 147, 178 (3d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).
169. Id. at 323.
170. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979).
171. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 233 (1990).
172. Treating Crazy People, supra note 14, at 383. "[A]n adversary system is premised on
the assumption that the truth is best determined by a fully adversarial airing of the issues, and
there is no reason to believe that the theory is less applicable in mental health cases." Id.
Nevertheless, the enhanced truth-finding function of formal adversary proceedings in such
cases depends, as it always does, on the sophistication of the judge and the advocates and their
ability to apply the existing literature gleaned from the work of cognitive psychologists.
Few courts or lawyers probe the basis for experts' claimed expertise beyond
examining their superficial and often-inflated resumes and curricula vitae ...
but intense scrutiny of the foundation of claimed expertise ought to be standard.
Certainly, the judiciary rarely has opportunity to take advantage of the large
body of experimentally derived knowledge and theoretical understanding that
pertains to clinical expertise. If it did, it would rigorously challenge experts to
define and demonstrate the power and limitations of their expertise ... by pro-
viding the court scientifically rigorous estimates of how likely they are to be
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as in Parham, the decisionmaker's judgment is subject to review only by a
colleague and fellow employee or, as in Harper, where the judgment of the
psychiatrist recommending compelled administration of medication is re-
viewed only by other non-legal professionals, the context is provided for op-
eration of all the biasing heuristics discussed herein.1 73
The Supreme Court has viewed the adversarial process as the arena in
which highly questionable evidence, such as predictions of future dangerous-
ness, can be tested.174 As the review of research has shown, predictions of
future violence are as fraught with error as other decisions mental health
professionals are asked to make. It is inconsistent with this literature for the
Court to value the adversary system and perceive it as the setting in which to
"separate the wheat from the chaff' 171 in cases involving predictions of vio-
lence but to abandon it in similar cases where predictions of future behavior,
including danger to self or others, will determine whether a mentally dis-
abled person will suffer deprivations of liberty, autonomy, or privacy. 176
III. COMPOUNDING THE ERRORS: IGNORING RESEARCH ON
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
The Supreme Court's developing preference for informal administrative
determinations, the restricted use of expert witnesses in such proceedings,' 77
and the very truncated scope of judicial review is also in conflict with the
burgeoning research on procedural justice. The consequences of the
Youngberg-Parham-Harper trilogy in the face of this research are that erro-
neous decisions will go largely unchecked but mentally disabled persons, left
with perceptions of unfairness and of being unheard, will become more resis-
tant to the treatment they are compelled to endure.
Procedural justice investigates the costs and benefits of various methods of
dispute resolution. While the cognitive psychology literature would argue
correct in their judgments, and how the court may assess the expert's decision-
making competence relative to that of ordinary persons.
Homer & Guyer, supra note 31, at 246.
173. Even those who argue that there is considerable accuracy to the diagnostic acumen of
psychologists and psychiatrists and decry the attack on the ability of these professionals to
make diagnostic judgments, such as made by Ziskin and Faust, see supra note 30, agree that
the validity of a mental health professional's opinion should be judged "by assuring that the
procedures of justice allow expert testimony to be challenged at trial." Steven K. Hoge &
Thomas Grisso, Accuracy and Expert Testimony, 20 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 67,
71 (1992) (emphasis added).
174. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983). "We are unconvinced.., that the
adversary process cannot be trusted to sort out the reliable from the unreliable evidence and
opinion about future dangerousness, particularly when the convicted felon has the opportunity
to present his own side of the case." Id.
175. Id. at 899 n.7.
176. It could be argued that the Supreme Court's preference for traditional adversary pro-
cedures involving predictions of future violence was, and should be, limited to death penalty
cases where the punishment is unique and final. But, liberty, autonomy, and privacy interests
are values that are almost always at the heart of cases involving mentally disabled persons.
The consequences of erroneously depriving such people of these rights "are the most serious
that our legal system can produce." Treating Crazy People, supra note 14, at 383.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
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that the accuracy of decisions would be enhanced by subjecting expert deci-
sionmaking to the formality of the adversary process rather than more infor-
mal mechanisms for dispute resolution, the focus of concern in procedural
justice is not on the equity or accuracy of outcomes among various methods
but with the fairness of the process, particularly as perceived by the partici-
pants. The classic work on procedural justice was the result of the collabo-
ration between social psychologist John Thibaut and law professor Laurens
Walker. 178
Thibaut and Walker differentiated between participants' control over the
opportunity to present evidence, which they called process control, and their
control over the final outcome, which they called decision control. Proce-
dural justice is concerned with process control. 179 In a series of laboratory
experiments, Thibaut and Walker showed that "disputants' judgments about
procedural fairness have an effect on the satisfaction that transcends the out-
come of disputes or the likelihood that particular procedures will be advan-
tageous to individual disputants."' 8 0 The major focus of comparison in the
early studies was between adversarial and inquisitorial systems of
adjudication. 181
The results of research on the perceived fairness between adversarial and
178. See JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL ANALYSIS (1975) [hereinafter THIBAUT & WALKER]. The first use of the term "proce-
dural justice" in this regard appeared the prior year. See John Thibaut et al., Procedural
Justice as Fairness, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (1974). Some of this early research was stimulated
by Harvard Law School Professor Lon Fuller. See Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in
TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 34 (Harold Berman ed., 1971) [hereinafter Fuller]. The first em-
pirical examination in the legal scholarly literature appears to be John Thibaut et al., Adversary
Presentation and Bias in Legal Decision-making, 86 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1972) [hereinafter
Adversary Presentation]. For a history and summary of this early research, see E. ALLAN
LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 7-40 (1988)
[hereinafter LIND & TYLER]; Joseph E. Schumacher et al., Procedural Justice Judgments of
Alternative Procedures for Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims, Paper Presented at Ameri-
can Psychological Association Annual Meeting (1991) [hereinafter Schumacher et al.].
179. For an alternative formulation of procedural justice, see Gerald S. Leventhal, What
Should be Done with Equity Theory? New Approaches to the Study of Fairness in Social Rela-
tionships, in SOCIAL EXCHANGE: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 27 (Kenneth J.
Gergan et al. eds., 1980). Leventhal defined fairness not only in terms of representation and
other components of process control, but also in terms of the dispute mechanism's ability to
suppress bias, improve decision quality or accuracy, afford opportunity to correct unfair or
inaccurate decisions, and the degree to which the decision-making process accords with gen-
eral standards of morality. See Tom R. Tyler, Rhat is Procedural Justice? Criteria Used by
Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 L. & Soc'Y REV. 103, 104-05 (1988).
180. William M. O'Barr & John M. Conley, Lay Expectations of the Civil Justice System,
22 L. & Soc'Y REV. 137, 137 (1988).
181. "In a pure adversary system, openly biased advocates urge their clients' cases before a
passive decision-maker. In a pure inquisitorial system ... an expert decision-maker actively
investigates the claims of unrepresented litigants." Adversary Presentation, supra note 178, at
388. There are hybrids between these two extremes. For example, in one hybrid a single
investigator appointed by the adjudicating body accumulates evidence for both sides and
presents his/her findings to the decision-making body; in another hybrid, two investigators,
each appointed to the respective parties, perform these functions. See E. Allan Lind et al.,




inquisitorial procedures has been remarkably consistent1 82 and robust: 8 3
First, subjects express a clear preference for adversarial procedures over
inquisitorial ones. Second, this preference is strongly influenced by sub-
jective judgments of fairness; the adversarial process is perceived as
more fair than the inquisitorial one. Perceptions of fairness are related
to the degree of control that disputants have over the dispute resolution
process. This dimension of "process control" may be important be-
cause of perceived or actual instrumental value (i.e., subjects believe
they can influence the outcome of disputes) and because of its symbolic
value regarding group membership (i.e., the opportunity to have a
"voice" in the process accords persons status as full-fledged members of
society). '8 14
Thibaut and Walker's findings have been buttressed by more recent and in-
creasingly sophisticated research gleaned from a number of different con-
texts and cultures and led by psychologists Tom Tyler, E. Allan Lind, and
others.'8 5
182. Blair H. Sheppard, Justice is No Simple Matter: Case for Elaborating Our Model of
Procedural Fairness, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 953, 954 (1985).
183. Kwok Leung & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice and Culture: Effects of Culture,
Gender, and Investigator Status on Procedural Preferences, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1134, 1134 (1986).
184. Schumacher et al., supra note 178, at 2-3 (citations omitted). For supporting studies,
see, e.g., LIND & TYLER, supra note 178; John Thibaut et al., Procedural Justice as Fairness, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1271 (1974); Thibaut & Walker, supra note 178; John Thibaut & Laurens
Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541 (1978). The term "voice" to mean
representation and the opportunity to be heard originated in ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT,
VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINES IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES
(1970) and has since been borrowed and used as a variable in procedural justice studies by
Folger and his colleagues. See, e.g., Robert Folger, Distributive and Procedural Justice: Com-
bined Impact of "Voice" and Improvement on Experienced Equity, 35 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 108 (1977).
mhe social psychological literature on procedural justice.., relates compliance
with legal decisions to a litigant's perception of fairness in the process. How
much "voice" has the litigant had? How much influence? How much support
from others? The literature looks at both a litigant's process control and his or
her outcome control.
David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New Approach to Mental
Health Law Policy Analysis and Research, 45 MIAMI L. REV. 979, 989 (1991) [hereinafter
Wexler & Winick].
The Supreme Court has also recognized the symbolic and psychological value of fair proce-
dures. In holding that procedural due process required a pretermination hearing when the
government seeks to discontinue public assistance payments to welfare recipients, the Court
recognized that such hearings furthered the government interest in reinforcing "the Nation's
basic commitment ... to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders."
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970).
185. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. BAYLES, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: ALLOCATING TO INDIVIDU-
ALS (1990) [hereinafter BAYLES]; LIND & TYLER, supra note 178; TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
FOLLOW THE LAW: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY AND COMPLIANCE (1990);
Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 L. & Soc'Y. REV. 483 (1988);
John H. Martin, Justice and Efficiency Under a Model of Estate Settlement, 66 VA. L. REV.
727 (1980); Gary Melton & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice in Family Court: Does the Ad-
versary Model Make Sense?, in LEGAL REFORMS AFFECTING CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERV-
ICES 65 (Gary Melton ed., 1982); William M. O'Barr & John M. Conley, Lay Expectations of
the Civil Justice System, 22 L. & Soc'Y REV. 137 (1988) (small claims court); Tom R. Tyler,
What is Procedural Justice? Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Proce-
dures, 22 L. & Soc'Y REV. 103 (1988); Tom R. Tyler & Andrew Caine, The Influence of
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Another benefit hypothesized to be derived from the adversary system,
other than a sense of fairness or "process control," is that partisan advocacy
and the competitive presentation of evidence diminishes the possibility that
only a skewed set of facts will be heard, thereby counteracting deci-
sionmaker bias. The adversary process will produce more facts and useful
information, and each of the parties' evidence will be tested through vigor-
ous cross-examination. 18 6 Professor Fuller presciently conjectured that the
adversary system was the most valid means for combating the effects of
heuristics that would otherwise befall legal decisionmakers:
What generally occurs in practice is that at some early point a familiar
pattern will seem to emerge from the evidence; an accustomed label is
waiting for the case and without awaiting further proofs, this label is
promptly assigned to it .... But what starts as a preliminary diagnosis
designed to direct the inquiry tends, quickly and imperceptibly, to be-
come a fixed conclusion, as all that confirms that diagnosis makes a
strong imprint on the mind, while all that runs counter to it is received
with diverted attention.
An adversary presentation seems the only effective means for com-
bating this natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the
familiar that which is not yet fully known.18 7
Empirical research appears to support Professor Fuller's thesis. Studies in
which subjects have been deliberately biased, by receiving expectations that a
case would yield a certain outcome (e.g., the defendant is guilty) show that
such subjects, when offered evidence under an adversary system, make less
extreme judgments than those under an inquisitorial system.188 The inquisi-
torial system is less effective in forcing decisionmakers to confront their bi-
ases. "Thus, it is principally in the adversary mode of presentation that the
biased decisionmaker feels compelled to struggle to suppress any behavioral
evidence that would sustain an attribution of bias."' 189
Outcomes and Procedures on Satisfaction with Formal Leaders, 41 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 642 (1981); Tom R. Tyler & Robert Folger, Distributional and Procedural Aspects of
Satisfaction with Citizen-Police Encounters, 1 BASIC & APPLIED PSYCHOL. 281 (1980). But see
Kwok Leung & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice and Culture: Effects of Culture, Gender and
Investigator Status on Procedural Preferences, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1134(1986) (American subjects preferred adversary model; Hong Kong Chinese preferred inquisito-
rial model). The MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Mental Health and the Law, a
12-member task force conducting and commissioning studies on mental health law, will be
investigating the application of procedural justice literature to patients' perceptions of coer-
cion. For a brief review of the work of the MacArthur Foundation Research Network, see
Wexler & Winick, supra note 184, at 986-89 (1991).
186. See Adversary Presentation, supra note 178, at 390.
187. Fuller, supra note 178, at 43-44.
188. See, e.g., Adversary Presentation, supra note 178, at 395-401. "The associated deter-
minations that adversary as compared with inquisitorial presentation produced an overall sig-
nificant difference in final judgments and further that the significant part of that difference was
produced at sessions with biased subjects permit the conclusion that Fuller's hypothesis has
validity ...." Id. at 397. This finding appears to transcend cultures. See E. Allan Lind et al.,
A Cross-Cultural Comparison of the Effect of Adversary and Inquisitorial Processes on Bias in
Legal Decision-making, 62 VA. L. REV. 271 (1976) (a study of bias in the adversary system
using French subjects).
189. Adversary Presentation, supra note 178, at 401. But see Neil Vidmar & Nancy M.
Laird, Adversary Social Roles: Their Effects on Witnesses' Communication of Evidence and the
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In sum, a party to a dispute will judge an adjudicatory process to be fair,
just, and unbiased to the extent that process control is shared equally among
the disputants, that the disputants believe that the evidence they present is
actually taken into account, and, most importantly, that decisionmakers are
strictly neutral as they judge the conflicting claims of the disputants. 190 It is
just these values that are present in formal adjudicatory proceedings before
judges and missing in the kinds of decisional processes for which the
Supreme Court has shown preference. In the kind of due process delineated
in Parham, there is almost total absence of equal voice for the putative pa-
tient, and a non-legal decisionmaker employed by the institution decides
whether or not compelled hospitalization is appropriate. In Harper, the
decisionmakers are likely to share the heuristic biases of the psychiatrist
seeking to compel administration of psychotropic medication, and the pri-
mary or only voice for the patient is a lay adviser who shares the values of
the medical model.191
Finally, and only very briefly, one of the consistent findings in the proce-
dural justice literature is that the sense of fairness that arises out of genuinely
adversarial proceedings evokes greater satisfaction with the outcome and
more acceptance of the verdict, even by the losing party. 192 The failure to
provide an adversarial forum, then, is likely to reduce compliance with the
decision, producing increased temporal, financial, and administrative bur-
Assessments of Adjudicators, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 888 (1983); Blair H. Shep-
pard & Neil Vidmar, Adversarial Pretrial Procedures and Testimonial Evidence: Effects of
Lawyer's Role and Machiavellianism, 39 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 320 (1980). These
authors suggest that witnesses called by the party, as in the adversarial system, rather than by
the court, as in the inquisitorial system, may produce more biased testimony. "[R]elative to
nonadversary procedures, adversary procedures reduced certain types of cognitive bias in legal
decision-making, sometimes introduced bias in the evidence presented to the decision maker,
and resulted in perceptions on the part of the disputants that both the procedure and the
outcome were more fair." Melton & Lind, supra note 185, at 67 (citations omitted); LIND &
TYLER, supra note 178. These works, however, do not reveal whether the outcomes are biased.
Thus, further research is needed on this issue. But see Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901
(1983) (adversary process can be trusted to sort out reliable from unreliable evidence); see also
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 ("function of legal process is to minimize the risk of
erroneous decisions").
190. See Ronald L. Cohen, Procedural Justice and Participation, 38 HuM. REL. 643, 646
(1985) [hereinafter Cohen]. "Biased and interested decisionmakers are less likely to reach cor-
rect decisions." Bayles, supra note 185, at 135.
191. In Harper, the defendant was assisted by a nurse practitioner. Washington v. Harper,
494 U.S. 210, 256 n.30 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (1990). Further infirmities of the informal
administrative procedure used in Harper arise from the fact that there is only truncated judi-
cial review, reducing the possibility that errors will be corrected. More importantly, there is
the opportunity for ex parte communication prior to the hearing between the state and the
tribunal. Id. at 235-36. "If one party communicates to the decision-maker without the other
party present, then there is an appearance of partiality; the decision-maker appears to have a
special relationship to the communicating party." Bayles, supra note 185, at 35. And, of
course, the neutrality of the decisionmakers is questionable. "The independence of deci-
sionmakers involves two elements: not being subject to the control of a party or group with an
interest at stake and not mixing decision making with incompatible functions." Id. at 29.
Both these elements are violated in Harper-like procedures.
192. See Cohen, supra note 190, at 645; Stephen LaTour, Determinants of Participant and
Observer Satisfaction with Adversary and Inquisitorial Modes of Adjudication, 36 J. PERSONAL-
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1531 (1978); Laurens Walker et al., Reactions of Participants and Ob-
servers to Modes of Adjudication, 4 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 295 (1974).
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dens on the institutions and professionals who participate in proceedings
perceived as unfair, biased, and unjust. 193 Thus, in addition to the infirmi-
ties of the Parham-Harper forms of adjudication already considered herein, a
legal system that prefers informal, non-legal decisionmakers may be
countertherapeutic, thereby redounding to the detriment of the population
of mentally disabled persons.194
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has asserted that "[c]ommon human experience and
scholarly opinions suggest that the supposed protections of an adversary
proceeding to determine the appropriateness of medical decisions for the
commitment and treatment of mental and emotional illness may be more
illusory than real." 195 This Article exposes the serious fallacies in that
statement.
The literature summarized in Part II should disabuse members of the
Court and readers of the infirmity of relying on "common human experi-
193. Thus, "time-consuming procedural minuets" may, in the long run, save time and
trouble. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605 (1979). Even if decreased formality and less adver-
sarial procedures cut time and cost, they would do so "only at the counteracting cost of sub-
stantially increasing the risk of prejudice toward disfavored minorities. The integrity of legal
decision-making and the welfare of the disordered require that mental health cases should be
decided by judges or other neutral legal decisionmakers." Treating Crazy People, supra note
14, at 384. But it is also not accepted universally that stringent formal procedural safeguards
necessarily produce inordinate delay, as asserted by the en banc court in United States v.
Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 309 n.5 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1017 (1990) and Chief
Justice Burger in Parham. See, e.g., Are Courts Competent?, supra note 22, at 986 ("fear of
time-consuming 'battles of experts' is... unfounded"); Francine Cournos et al., A Comparison
of Clinical Procedures for Reviewing Requests for Involuntary Medication in New York, 39
Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY, 851, 855 (1988) [hereinafter Cournos et al.] (Stringent
legal procedures in psychotropic medication refusal cases "did not delay or diminish requests
for or approval of involuntary treatment.").
194. The Supreme Court has impliedly acknowledged the therapeutic value of fair proce-
dures in holding that parolees have a right to a probable cause preliminary hearing before their
paroles may be revoked. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972). "Society has a fur-
ther interest in treating the parolee with basic fairness: fair treatment in parole revocations
will enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness." Id. In fact,
there is now a developing legal and psychological literature that examines how the legal system
may act more therapeutically. See, e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:
THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990); ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
(David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991).
"Although Chief Justice Burger [in Parham] defended his judgment based on concerns that
a hearing would burden the family relationship and be detrimental to the therapeutic goals of
hospitalization, others have questioned these assumptions and suggested that there is a thera-
peutic value in holding commitment hearings." Wexler & Winick, supra note 185, at 985. A
relevant empirical study demonstrates that providing rigorous procedural protections for
mental patients refusing psychotropic medication offered these patients, "considerably greater
representation and participation," gave them "the opportunity to hear a detailed discussion of
their physician's reasoning and to present their own views," and, as a result, enabled them to
"gain a better understanding of the need for treatment through a process that offers this degree
of patient involvement." Cournos et al., supra note 193, at 855. In general, a "modest body of
literature developed over the past decade suggests that involuntary civil commitment hearings
have a therapeutic potential." Are Courts Competent?, supra note 22, at 985.
195. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979).
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ence" as a decisionmaking tool. 196 Notwithstanding the "scholarly opinion"
upon which the Court has relied, Parts II and III offer research that demon-
strates that the Court's increasing preference for informal decisionmaking in
fora controlled by nonlegal professionals and administrators is contrary to a
whole universe of sound, consensual, and intersecting social science evi-
dence. At the very least, that literature reveals that clinical decisionmaking
in general and forensic decisionmaking in particular are subject to a variety
of serious distortions and errors that are very likely to go undiscovered and
uncorrected in the absence of formal adversarial proceedings presided over
by a neutral, judicial decisionmaker.
Admittedly, judges are subject to the same heuristic biases and decision-
making foibles that lead to erroneous judgments by clinicians and laype-
ople. 19 7 There has been a shameful tendency for judges and counsel for the
mentally disabled to accede too easily to professional discretion. 198 How-
ever, a judicially-based adversary system permits the parties to present com-
peting hypotheses and data, which serve as checks and correctives to
decisional errors. It is hoped that this Article may lead to more sophisti-
cated examination by attorneys of mental health professionals and more ju-
dicial skepticism of their judgment and expertise.
As for the alleged deceptive benefits of a full measure of due process, it
was Judge Frankel who remarked, "[W]e have allowed ourselves too often to
sacrifice truth to other values that are inferior, or even illusory."' 199 Such
values include temporal and financial economy and the putatively wasteful
allocation of scarce professional resources that judicial decisionmaking in an
196. For further criticism of common sense decisionmaking in mental disability law, see
Psychodynamics, supra note 31, at 22-39. See also Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in
the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 671-72 (1981) ("dominant legal thought
is nothing but some more or less plausible common-wisdom banalities, superficialities, and
generalities"); cf Disraeli's comment that "[a] practical man is a man who practices the errors
of his forefathers," cited in APHORISMS 255 (W.H. Auden & Louis Kronenberger eds., reissue
1981).
197. "Judges can also conflate medical and legal issues, but they are best situated by train.
ing, experience and role definition to be neutral decisionmakers who recognize the moral and
political nature of their legal tasks." Treating Crazy People, supra note 14 at 383-84.
198. "Many researchers have commented on the rapidity of commitment hearings and the
tendency of judges to discourage careful inquiry and cross-examination by the respondent's
attorney .... " Paul S. Appelbaum, Civil Commitmentfrom a Systems Perspective, 16 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 61, 66 (1992) [hereinafter Appelbaum]. "Attorneys for both parties, but partic-
ularly for respondents, have been chastised repeatedly in the legal literature for playing their
roles in a perfunctory manner." Id. Accord Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism", 46 SMU L.
REV. 373 (1992); Why the Gap?, supra note 14, at 647 (citations omitted).
In many instances, judges discourage attorneys from taking an active part in
commitment hearings or they take over the role of questioning respondents and
witnesses. Proceedings are often extremely informal, and judges frequently fail
to advise respondents of some or all of their rights. Moreover, judges, like attor-
neys, often defer to clinical recommendations in the determination of mental
illness and dangerousness.
Id. For empirical support that even procedurally rigorous statutes can still result in less than
fully realized adversarial procedural safeguards, see Serena D. Stier & Kurt J. Stoebe, Project,
Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Iowa: The Failure of the 1975 Legislation, 64
IOWA L. REV. 1284 (1978). But, "when attorneys do assume an adversarial role ... there is a
significant reduction in the number of respondents involuntarily committed." Id.
199. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 12 (1980).
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adversarial setting would require. Thus, there is a certain surface appeal to
unfettered professional discretion, decisionmaking by administrative tribu-
nal, or even a more enlightened hybrid in which a panoply of procedural
safeguards would be embedded in an adversarial, but administrative, fo-
rum. 200 Yet, any savings of time and scarce professional resources are
illusory. 201
Even if professional judgment were sufficiently accurate to be relied on to
determine the rights of mentally disabled persons, there are countervailing
values that offset any alleged temporal or financial benefits of administrative
fora. The Supreme Court's pronouncements notwithstanding, the consensus
of scholarly opinion perceives decisions such as whether to compel compe-
tent mental patients to be medicated, or to involuntarily commit disturbed
persons to mental hospitals or execution, as transcending medical or psycho-
logical judgments. 20 2 Until the Supreme Court began to remedicalize
200. For a very recent description of such a model, based on Parham, Vitek, and Harper,
see Appelbaum, supra note 198.
201. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. Accepting for the sake of argument that
there would be some time savings if hearings were held before psychologists and psychiatrists
rather than judges, a system that used mental health professionals as primary decisionmakers
would require that they not only attend and preside at hearings but deliberate and eventually
write opinions that contained findings of fact and comported with existing law.
202. Perhaps the most articulate scholar in this regard has been Professor Stephen Morse.
He has argued, persuasively I think, that the preference for informal decisionmaking and reli-
ance on mental health professionals to decide cases concerning mentally disabled persons is
grounded in the Supreme Court's fundamentally flawed assumption that the issues in these
cases are primarily medical or psychiatric ones. The ultimate issues in these cases, he asserts,
concern liberty, autonomy, and dignity and thus "the ultimate question in mental health law is
always social, moral, political, and legal." Treating Crazy People, supra note 14, at 359, 380-
85.
See Durham & La Fond, supra note 14, at 436 ("the decision to commit a person to a mental
health facility is ultimately a legal decision and not solely a medical one"). Although Durham
& La Fond limit their analysis to involuntary civil commitment, their conceptualization cap-
tures the conflict more generally. "The debate [over civil commitment] has raged with special
intensity because it implicates competing political ideologies, moral values, decision-making
models, and claims of expertise." Id. at 396. "[W]hile greater reliability and somewhat better
accuracy could well be developed in the future by ... [mental health] professionals, in the final
analysis the ultimate decisions regarding dangerousness should be based on legal and public
policy judgments." Shah, supra note 14, at 239.
Ultimate issues concerning the rights of the mentally disabled "require moral, legal, and
public policy-not psychiatric, psychological, or scientific judgments." Id. at 250 (emphasis in
original). "De novo judicial review of governance decisions to initiate or terminate medication
will curb... excesses. The judiciary can at its best discern common interests through the haze
of cognitive politics." Peter Margulies, The Cognitive Politics of Professional Conflict: Law
Reform, Mental Health Treatment Technology, and Citizen Self-Governance, 5 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 25, 56-60 (1992).
There are some.., who say that we should leave these delicate questions of state
intervention to the behavioral experts. But I would remind those who suggest
this-both outside and within the legal profession-that state intervention in-
volves compromise of individual right and hence a difficult balancing of power
between the state and the individual, where the stakes are highest for human
and personal rights. Courts have traditionally been the protector of individual
rights against state power, and there is no reason why the particularly difficult
problems in the area of state intervention are any different. We cannot delegate
this responsibility to the medical professions.
David L. Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization and the Adversary Process, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 897, 910-11 (1975).
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mental health law, a variety of lower courts expressed similar views.203
The fact that mental health professionals are universally admitted as ex-
perts on issues within their areas of competence does not ineluctably lead to
the conclusion that they make accurate professional judgments or are pre-
ferred decisionmakers.204 Mental health professionals are of greatest service
as data gatherers, not "as substitutes for judicial decisionmakers. ' '20 5 The
psychiatric and psychological components of decisions affecting the rights of
mentally disabled persons are not so proportionately great nor is the ability
of mental health professionals to arrive at accurate judgments so demonstra-
ble, that their expertise should dominate all other considerations. They may
be expert enough to offer their professional observations, data, and judg-
ments, but they lack knowledge of the legal, moral, and social values to bal-
ance all of the interests at stake. Society has placed that role in the hands of
the judges.
The psychological values inherent in fully realized adversarial proceedings
lead disputants, even the losing party, to view such proceedings as more just
and objective than hearings conducted by administrative tribunals. Thus,
mentally disabled litigants will take away from judicial proceedings the feel-
ing that they have been dealt with fairly, and that they, like all citizens, are
203. See, e.g., United States v. Makris, 535 F.2d 899, 908 (5th Cir. 1976). "Especially
where the medical expert applies legal standards to arrive at a competency conclusion, he is
performing a task at which only a judge is truly expert. In the final analysis, the determination
of competency is a legal conclusion .... " Id. at 908. Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d
444, 453-54 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
[Tihe jury must decide... whether or not the defendant is blameworthy. Un-
doubtedly, the decision is often painfully difficult, and perhaps its very difficulty
accounts for the readiness with which we have encouraged the expert to decide
the question. But our society has chosen not to give this decision to psychia-
trists or to any other professional elite ....
Id. at 453-54. "The determination of dangerousness involves a delicate balancing of Society's
interest in protection from harmful conduct against the individual's interest in personal liberty
and autonomy. This decision, while requiring the court to make use of the assistance which
medical testimony may provide, is ultimately a legal one, not a medical one." State v. Krol,
344 A.2d 289, 302 (N.J. 1975). Even the Supreme Court in the not too distant past recognized
this point.
We recognize that the inquiry involved in determining whether or not to trans-
fer an inmate to a mental hospital for treatment involves a question that is essen-
tially medical.... The medical nature of the inquiry, however, does not justify
dispensing with due process requirements. It is precisely "[t]he subtleties and
nuances of psychiatric diagnoses" that justify the requirement of adversary
hearings.
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980) (citation omitted).
204. As the Court acknowledged in Barefoot, the rules of evidence require very little in the
way of reliability of professional judgment for expert opinions to be admissible. See supra note
139 and accompanying text.
205. Menzies et al., supra note 128, at 464. "[E]xperts should serve as guides to behav-
ior.... [T]he expert may focus the court's attention on relevant behavior that would not be
noticed by laypersons." Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of
Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 615 (1978). "Medical testimony is certainly
relevant to the decision [to commit a person to a mental health facility], but it is not to be
substituted for the legal determination." Durham & La Fond, supra note 14, at 436. See
David Bazelon, Veils, Values and Social Responsibility, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 115, 115
(1982) (asserting that courts should "open the courthouse doors" to mental health profession-
als but "never hand over the keys").
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not to be treated as "invisible" persons, 2° 6 but with the right to a full mea-
sure of voice and respect.
206. RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN (1947).
